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DO SALES BELOW COST LAWS PROTECT SMALL BUSINESSES? 
by Jeremy 
Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee: Dr. Daniel Sutter 
 Department of Economics 
This paper examines whether state laws to prevent below cost sales provide protection for 
small businesses beyond the protection afforded by the federal antitrust laws. The paper 
first identifies the theoretical implications of state sales below cost laws. I find that there 
are various circumstances when the state law will provide additional protection to the 
federal predatory pricing laws. The uniqueness of the empirical section of this paper is 
based on the functional form of the tests and the distinctive features of the state laws used 
to discern the laws impact on small businesses. I find that state laws do have a small impact 
on the viability of small businesses in certain industries. Additionally, the differences 
among the state laws also have an impact on the percentage of small businesses in a state. 
However, the effects of these laws are relatively understated and potentially inconsistent 
with the goals of competition.  
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
The 1930's saw the rapid expansion of chain stores.1 States responded to this 
changing business climate by creating legislation forbidding sales of goods below cost 
(SBC), which twenty-nine states adopted by 1941. Some states enacted SBC laws to 
protect small businesses by preventing firms from selling goods below cost with the intent 
of injuring competitors, competition or deceiving consumers, while others simply forbid 
loss leader selling practices.2  
States enacted SBC laws despite the fact that federal legislation already prevented 
monopolization and attempts to monopolize. SBC laws differed from the federal laws at 
their time of inception because actual or potential monopolization was never requisite for a 
violation of the state laws. The distinction between the state and federal laws became more 
profound as the interpretation of federal predatory pricing laws evolved.  
While authors have studied federal predatory pricing extensively, significantly less 
attention has focused on the state legislation. The state laws have been empirically 
examined three times. Studies by Houston (1981), Anderson and Johnson (1999) 
empirically tested the effects of SBC laws in cross-sectional regressions, while Skidmore, 
Peltier, and Alm (2005) utilized a panel data set. This dissertation examines whether SBC 
legislation impacted the viability of small businesses using a panel data approach that 
accounts for differences in state SBC laws. I seek to answer several questions in this 
dissertation. Do SBC laws provide protection for small businesses beyond coverage of the 
                                                 
1 Thomas W. Ross, Store Wars: The Chain Tax Movement, 29 Journal of Law and Economics 125,125 (1986), discusses 
the magnitude of growth of chain stores.  Francis M., Dougherty, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Statutory Provision Prohibiting Sales of Commodities Below Cost- Modern Cases, 41 A.L.R. 4th 612 (2000), addresses 
the intent behind the creation of SBC laws.  
   
 
2 
federal laws? Do provisions affecting the application of varying state laws yield more 
protection for small businesses? Did the evolution of predatory pricing alter the 
effectiveness of state SBC laws? 
The results of this study indicate that SBC laws did protect small businesses in 
certain industries, however the impact is relatively small. Some specific state provisions of 
state laws resulted in even greater protection for small businesses, while other provisions 
had little to no impact. Finally, the tests illustrate that the initial changes to federal 
predatory pricing laws resulted in greater small business protection by SBC laws, however, 
it is questionable whether SBC laws have become more attractive as a result of the most 
modern federal interpretations of predatory pricing.    
This study is organized as follows. Chapter One provides a review of the relevant 
literature. Chapter Two provides a legal analysis of federal predatory pricing, state sales 
below cost laws, and resale price maintenance. Chapter three offers a theoretical discussion 
of the application of SBC laws compared with the federal standard of predatory pricing. 
Chapter Four provides empirical tests of the state SBC laws. The last chapter concludes the 
study. 
The below-cost sales laws have not received the same notoriety as predatory pricing 
in either legal or economic journals.  The vast majority of legal publications tend to discuss 
the constitutionality of the state laws3; however, one author does attempt to empirically 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See, Cal Bus. & Prof Code  §§ 17030, 17044 (2003) 
3 Francis M. Dougherty, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory Provision Prohibiting Sales of 
Commodities Below Cost- Modern Cases, 41 A.L.R. 4th 612 (1985);  Note, State Legislation Prohibiting Sales Below 
Cost, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1142(1939); Oler, Statutory Inhibition against Sales Below Cost 43 Dick. L. Rev. 112 (1939); 
Note, Constitutionality of Statute Prohibiting Sales at Less than Cost, 47 Yale L.J. 1201 (1939); Note, Statutory Bans 
Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest Antidote for Big Business, 25 Va. L. Rev., 699 (1939) 
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evaluate the impact of below-cost sales laws in the context of gasoline-specific SBC laws.4  
This article recognizes that these laws do not attract significant attention in the literature, 
while acknowledging that these claims are more likely to be successful and often provide 
remedies differing from their federal counterparts.5 
The purpose of this dissertation is to illustrate the fine dividing line between the 
federal and state laws, as well as to develop a theoretical model that explains why the state 
claims will have a tendency to produce results differing from a federal predatory pricing 
action.  Finally, I intend to empirically demonstrate that the SBC laws give rise to 
protectionist outcomes, regardless of whether the conduct of the defendant was efficient. 
 
                                                 
4 Rod W. Anderson and Ronald N Johnson, Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline, Review of 
Industrial Organization 14 189-204, 1999 
5 Id. at 190. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
 
FEDERAL PREDATORY PRICING, STATE SALES  
BELOW COST LAWS, AND FAIR TRADE 
A.  Introduction 
 “Predatory pricing claims are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful”.6  This 
statement in the case Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp. is 
representative of the Court’s attitude towards predatory pricing claims over the past twenty 
years.  While scholars and legal analysts still find much to debate regarding predatory 
pricing claims, courts now seem more reluctant to enforce claims of predatory pricing. 
 A claim of predatory pricing is enforceable under both Section 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. However, the federal antitrust laws are not the 
only avenues of litigation for firms that have fallen prey to predatory pricing.  Numerous 
states enacted legislation frequently referred to as sales below cost laws or unfair sales acts, 
which specifically prohibit the type of pricing conduct that would violate either the 
Sherman Act or the Robinson-Patman Act.  These state laws were typically enacted to 
protect small businesses7 and prevent the use of loss leader selling.8 The state enactments 
are broader than the federal laws because they do not require the same standard of injury to 
competition. For instance, state laws typically prohibit loss leader selling, which is a 
practice the federal laws condone. While the state laws were not specifically tailored to act 
upon the federal courts' reluctance to enforce predatory pricing claims, state laws give 
                                                 
6 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) 
7 Ronald N. Johnson, The Impact of Sales-Below-Cost Laws on the U.S. Retail Gasoline Market, A Report Prepared for 
Industry Canada, Competition Bureau, February 1999. 
8 Note, Statutory Bans Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest Antidote for Big Business, 25 Va. L. Rev., 699, 700 (1939) 
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potential defendants alternative avenues to attack a firm selling below cost, whether or not 
the conduct is actually predatory. 
 In this Sections B and C of this chapter, I first discuss the both the historical and 
current application of the federal antitrust laws to predatory pricing. Since the federal and 
state laws overlap on the issue of predatory pricing, I include the discussion of the federal 
laws to illustrate how the initial and modern interpretations of the federal laws can alter the 
significance of the state laws. I discuss the Court’s interpretation of both the Sherman Act 
and Robinson-Patman Act with respect to predatory pricing, and illustrate how the Court 
has converged to the application of these two acts into a uniform standard for evaluating 
federal predatory pricing claims.  
 In section D of this chapter, I discuss the state sales below cost laws. This 
discussion illustrates how the state laws overlap with the federal laws and address conduct 
outside the scope of the federal laws as well. I also illustrate how the state laws attempt to 
promote small businesses by deterring various types of pricing conduct. Given that the state 
laws are not identical, I also present the various features and applications commonly found 
in the state acts, and discuss how these intricacies affect the states’ goal of protecting small 
business. 
B.  Federal Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
1. Historical Treatment of Predatory Pricing Under the Sherman Act 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished 
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by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court. 9 
 
In addition, the federal antitrust laws allow for private parties to sue under the antitrust laws 
and receive treble damages if they manage to succeed in proving an antitrust violation.10 
 Traditionally, the antitrust laws evaluate predatory pricing as an attempt to 
monopolize under section two of the Sherman Act.  The standards for an attempt to 
monopolize, while moderately difficult to prove, are certainly not insurmountable. A 
plaintiff must prove the following elements to establish an attempt to monopolize claim: 
1. That the defendant has engaged in predatory or anti-competitive conduct;   
2. With a specific intent to monopolize market; 
3. And has a dangerous probability of success in achieving monopoly power in the 
market.11 
    The first element of an attempt to monopolize relates to the defendant’s conduct. 
The offense requires anticompetitive behavior, and predation clearly falls into category of 
impermissible anti-competitive activity under section two of the Sherman Act.12  The 
second element of this offense requires a showing that the defendant intended to gain 
monopoly power in the relevant market. As with any legal case involving an attempt to 
take an action, the defendant must have specific intent to bring about a result. General 
                                                 
9 15 U.S.C. §2 
10 15 U.S.C. §15. 
11 Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, West Group, 2000, p. 
132. 
12 E. Thomas Sullivan and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and its Economic Implications, Third Edition, 
Lexis Publishing, 1998, pp. 314-323. 
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intent is sufficient to establish a claim of monopolization. The difference between the two 
is that a plaintiff must show that the alleged illegal activity was not the result of an accident 
or mistake.13 The last element of an attempt requires that the defendant have a dangerous 
probability of succeeding in gaining monopoly power.  This requires a plaintiff to show 
that that defendant was dangerously close to creating or maintaining monopoly power in 
the relevant market.  This evaluation hinges on the market share of the defendant firm, as 
well as the barriers to entry that exist in the market. A firm with little share of the market or 
no ability to deter entry into the market cannot reasonably succeed in attaining monopoly 
power. Thus, the plaintiff must adequately illustrate that a defendant has the ability to gain 
and maintain a monopoly, in order to establish an attempt to monopolize claim.14 
Prior to 1975, the relevant inquiry under the Sherman Act for whether a firm 
attempted to monopolize utilizing predatory pricing was: 1) whether the accused predator 
reduced his price below his short-run average total cost; 2) whether this seemed to have 
been done with predatory intent; 3) whether the activity was successful in either 
eliminating a competitor, precipitating a merger, or improving market discipline.15   
 A case study on predatory pricing cases in 1971 demonstrated that 123 predatory 
pricing claims were filed beginning with the Standard Oil16 and American Tobacco cases in 
191117. The courts found that the defendant engaged in predatory pricing in ninety-five of 
                                                 
13 Ibid. at 315. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ronald H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, Antitrust Law & Economics Review, 4 
Antitrust Law and Economics Review 105 (1971)  
16 Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911) 
17 U.S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) 
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these instances.18 Thus, plaintiffs regularly filed predatory pricing claims between the 
enactment of the Sherman Act and the year 1975, and often succeeded.  
2.  1975 to 1986- The Areeda-Turner Test 
 The law of predatory pricing took a significant turn in 1975 with the publication of 
the article “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act”.19 
This article proposed the much debated and controversial average variable cost test. This 
test was sometimes used for the purpose of detecting predatory pricing without considering 
any other factors. 
  The Areeda-Turner Test criticized any finding of predation where the defendant did 
not price below average variable cost. According to the Areeda-Turner Test, the court 
should not find prices at or above marginal costs predatory, because they are consistent 
with a firm’s profit maximizing strategy. Additionally, prices above average total cost are 
not predatory because the firm is profitable. Thus, a price below marginal cost was stated 
as the appropriate measure of cost, because it is not consistent with a firm’s current profit 
maximizing strategy. Areeda and Turner proposed using average variable cost as a proxy 
for marginal cost since marginal cost is typically not observable.20 
The Areeda-Turner Test had a profound effect on how courts addressed predatory 
pricing claims.  First, the test actually added a higher hurdle in terms of proving price 
                                                 
18 Koller II, supra note 15, at 111 (1971)  
19 Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975). 
20 Ibid. 
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below cost.  Courts were willing to adopt the Areeda-Turner average variable cost test,21 
rather than using the higher estimate of cost at average total cost that the courts previously 
accepted.  However, apparently some courts took the average variable cost test to mean that 
the element of dangerous probability of success was also satisfied when a firm priced 
below cost.22  While the Areeda-Turner Test was originally applied to a firm that was 
already a monopolist, thus eliminating the need for an analysis of a dangerous probability 
of success, the courts applied the same logic even when the defendant firm did not have 
monopoly power at the time it priced below cost.23  In fact, this oversight by the courts may 
have contributed to why the Areeda- Turner test corresponds empirically with an increase 
in predatory pricing litigation.  In the period between the inception of Areeda-Turner and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita in 1986, fifty-five predatory pricing claims 
were filed in the federal courts and twenty-seven journal articles were written on the 
subject.24  Furthermore, it is possible that out of the fifty-five cases filed in the federal 
courts, only three might have survived dismissal under the Matsushita standard announced 
several years later.25  
3.  1986-Present- Matsushita  
With the case Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp V. Zenith Radio Corp., in 1986, 
the Chicago School of Economics finally won out in predatory pricing litigation. Judge 
                                                 
21 Herbert Hovencamp, Antitrust, 3rd. Edition, West Group, 1999, p.121; See also, Pacific Engineering & Prod. Of Nevada 
v. Kerr-Mc-Gee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 
Inc., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)  
22 Hovencamp, supra note 42, at 121. 
23 Id. 
24 Wesley J. Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1052, 
1052 (1986) 
25 Id. at Appendix B 
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Easterbrook claimed long before the Court’s decision that predatory pricing does not merit 
legal attention, because of the rarity and rationality of the practice.26  In addition, Judge 
Posner contends that in the long run, entry will vanquish a predator’s attempt to recoup 
losses.27  Given the substantial investment resulting from selling below cost, and an 
increased quantity sold at a loss, rational firms would not partake in this behavior.28   
The Court particularly doubted that a firm could rationally absorb losses for a 
period of time long enough to eliminate rivals, and then successfully recoup the losses 
incurred during the predatory conduct period.29 As a result, the Court altered the standard 
of review in predatory pricing case. In order for a plaintiff to now recover on the grounds of 
predatory pricing under the Sherman Act, it must show that the defendant: 1) priced below 
an appropriate measure of the defendant’s costs30, and 2) “had …a dangerous probability of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”31 The second element appears to be the real 
thorn of the new predatory pricing standard.  It is not enough now that the defendant has a 
dangerous probability of success in gaining a monopoly, but additionally the defendant 
must show a high likelihood of recouping its investment as well. This new standard 
requires that the defendant’s conduct must not only cause harm to rivals, but also be 
rational behavior on the part of the defendant. There is a paradox associated with this 
burden of proof because a plaintiff must be financially capable of incurring litigation 
                                                 
26 Frank Easterbrook, “Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies”, 48 U. Chic. L.Rev. 263 (1981) 
27 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th Edition, Little, Brown, and Company, 1992, pp. 305-310. 
28 Id. 
29 Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 590-591 (1986) 
30 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993) 
31 Id. at 224 
   
 
11 
expenses while concurrently illustrating that it is on the verge of going out of business. It 
must then demonstrate that the predator can maintain the market structure for a period of 
time sufficient to recoup its losses. Thus, predatory pricing claims are essentially 
hypothetical assessments pertaining to a firm’s ability to recoup losses in the future, 
making the claim difficult for small firms to pursue.    
C.  Federal Predatory Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman Act 
1. Historical Treatment and Utah Pie 
The Robinson-Patman Act traditionally provides for an action against predatory 
pricing, in addition to the protection that the Sherman Act provides. The Robinson-Patman 
Act was enacted to prevent price discrimination, and it is applicable when a firm is selling 
the same good to two different customers at two different prices. In the context of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, predatory pricing is more commonly known as primary-line price 
discrimination. Primary-line price discrimination involves charging different prices to 
different customers with the intent of injuring a competitor.32 The requirements necessary 
to support a claim under the Robinson-Patman Act prior to 1993 were: 
1. Predatory intent; 
2. Persistent sales below cost; 
3. A declining price structure.33  
The Utah Pie decision condemned behavior that supported a declining price 
structure, even when though the elimination of excess rents is a characteristic of a 
competitive market. The Robinson-Patman Act allowed plaintiffs an even simpler avenue 
                                                 
32 E. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 392. 
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to attack predatory pricing, because plaintiffs were not required to show that the plaintiff 
had a dangerous probability of achieving a monopoly position in the market. This doctrine 
outlasted the Matsushita decision, because the Matsushita decision pertained to the 
Sherman Act. This view of primary-line price discrimination continued until the Court’s 
decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 
(1993). 
 2. Brooke Group and the Uniform Treatment for Predatory Pricing 
In 1993, the Court decided the case Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., and announced a more formal standard of review for predatory pricing 
under the Robinson-Patman Act. Brooke Group took the standards created in Matsushita, 
and generally applied them to cases involving primary-line price discrimination.  
After Brooke, the only distinction between the Sherman Act and the Robinson-
Patman Act is assessing the probability that the defendant can recoup losses. The 
Robinson-Patman Act requires a showing that the defendant has a reasonable prospect of 
recouping its losses, rather than dangerous probability of recouping its losses. This is often 
interpreted as meaning that the potential predator can be punished if it can recoup its losses 
by using predatory prices as a punishment mechanism to induce rivals to increase prices.34 
This standard is still distinguishable from predatory pricing under the Sherman Act, 
because the plaintiff does not need to show that the defendant will monopolize the market. 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Utah Pie v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967) 
34 Patrick Bolton and Joseph F. Brodley, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2255 
(August 2000). 
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The requirements of this test have proved demanding, as no plaintiff has recovered on the 
grounds of predatory pricing in federal court since Brooke Group was decided.35  
If a case is brought on the grounds of predatory pricing it is unlikely that the 
plaintiff will have direct evidence that the defendant can recoup the losses sustained from 
predation.  The 10th Circuit decided a case soon after Brooke that illustrated factors that are 
relevant to determining whether a defendant has a “dangerous probability of success”.36  
The relevant factors are: 1) Market Share; 2) Whether defendant is a multi-market firm; 3) 
The number and strength of other competitors; 4) Market Trends; 5) Entry Barriers; 6) 
Ability to Absorb Losses37 While the 10th Circuit did state these numerous factors as a 
blueprint for a successful predatory pricing claim, the ability to prove these factors is still 
improbable, given the lack of a test illustrating what is required to prove recoupment. 
The progression of predatory pricing claims shows that the offense has undergone 
radical transformations since the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890.  As the federal laws of 
predatory pricing continue to erode, businesses will seek alternative remedies to the protect 
themselves, and suing under the state laws may provide to be the adequate remedy, since it 
may be a plaintiff’s only viable source of protection from a rival’s attempt to drive it out of 
business.  
                                                 
35 Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941, 941 (2002) 
36 Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d. 1540, 
1554 (1995) 
37 Ibid. 
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D. State Below-Cost Sales Acts 
South Carolina enacted the first sales below cost provision in 1902, and since then 
thirty other states created similar legislation, primarily in the late 1930s. Nine states have 
since repealed their laws. The statutes are protectionist in nature and legislatures adopted 
them primarily to prevent loss leader selling and to protect small businesses from mass-
merchandisers that could undercut the costs of the small retailers.38 These laws typically 
came in a variety of forms. Some states passed laws applying to only specific commodities 
such as milk or cigarettes, while some states enacted general laws that prevented the sale of 
any merchandise by a retailer, and often wholesaler, below cost.  The general sales-below 
cost laws are the primary focus of this study. The study is limited to these laws because 
very few authors choose to focus on the general laws, and elect to focus primarily on 
specific statutes instead. In particular, SBC laws specifically applying to gasoline garner 
the most attention. My goal is to address whether these laws of general application serve to 
deter pricing conduct that has the potential to harm small businesses of market structures 
and product lines.  
The SBC laws condemn the same predatory pricing conduct that the Sherman and 
Robinson-Patman Acts prohibit, as well as potential anticompetitive behavior that is 
outside the scope of the federal laws.39  Given that every state enacted its law after section 
2 of the Sherman Act was adopted,40 it is apparent that states sought to expand the scope of 
impermissible pricing practices beyond the Sherman Act. In particular, these laws penalize 
                                                 
38 Ronald N. Johnson, The Impact of Sales-Below-Cost Laws on the U.S. Retail Gasoline Market, A Report Prepared for 
Industry Canada, Competition Bureau, February 1999; Note, Statutory Bans Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest 
Antidote for Big Business, 25 Va. L. Rev., 699, 700 (1939) 
39 Letter to Delegate McDonnell of the Virginia House of Delegates from the Federal Trade Commission 
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below cost sales practices, regardless of whether the offender can recoup losses or imposes 
harm to competition.  Given that these laws are far more inclusive than their federal 
counterparts, it should be the case that more actions are tried on state grounds than under a 
predation theory.  Additionally, it should be the case that small retailers thrive to a larger 
extent in these jurisdictions, because the mass-retailers cannot use their financial backing to 
use predatory tactics.   
1. Characteristics of the Below-Cost Sales Laws 
The below cost sales laws are enacted on a state-by-state basis and share many 
common attributes. However, there are various provisions that are common to numerous 
states that can significantly alter the effect of the law. Unlike the prior studies of SBC laws, 
I will examine different characteristics of state laws, which might alter the effectiveness of 
the state law. Up to this point, all of the studies pertaining to SBC laws treat the legislation 
as homogeneous.  
All the state laws prohibit the selling of goods or merchandise below some 
appropriate measure of cost; however, the actual cost standard used to verify a below-cost 
sale varies from state to state. The measures of cost used by the states usually involve 
replacement cost, average variable cost, average total cost, or invoice cost. In addition to 
cost requirements, the state laws often require the intent to injure a competitor, competition, 
welfare, or the intent to divert trade from a competitor. However, the laws consider the 
conduct of pricing below cost prima facie evidence of intent to injure a competitor, destroy 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 South Carolina has the oldest SBC law  
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competition, divert trade, or cause other harms specified by the statutes.41 Establishing 
intent based on the conduct of selling below cost is one of the grounds for constitutional 
objections.42 These intent provisions pose a stark contrast from the federal predatory 
pricing laws that require specific intent to injure competition.43 Thus, the group of sellers 
affected under the federal laws substantially differs from those under the state laws. 
These laws do not regard efficiency as highly as the federal laws, but do highly 
value the protection of small firms in the market. In addition to restricting predatory 
pricing, the laws also prohibit the use of loss leader selling. Some states accomplish this by 
prohibiting the diversion of trade, while others specifically address loss leader selling.44 A 
pure loss leader does not amount to a claim that would survive summary judgment in the 
federal courts, because many types of exclusionary practices are actually very efficient and 
socially beneficial.45   
It appears as though some states do require that the below cost sales cause some 
kind of harm or unreasonable restraint of trade. This is frequently stated as an “adverse 
affect on competition” or “an injury to competition” in the relevant market. The 
interpretation of what constitutes an injury to competition under this law varies. The 
                                                 
41 For example, the Oklahoma law provides that Evidence of advertisement, offering to sell, or sale of merchandise by any 
retailer or wholesaler at less than cost to him, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors and to destroy 
or substantially lessen competition. 15 OK Stat. Ann. 598.5 (2005). This seems to be the case with the majority of states 
except Arkansas and Maine. For more on the Arkansas intent requirement see Wal-Mart Stores v. American Drugs, Inc. 
891 S.W.2d 30 (Ark. 1995) 
42 See, Dougherty, supra note 1, discussing how these provisions receive mixed treatment with respect to constitutional 
challenges.  
43 Herbert Hovencamp, Antitrust, 3rd. Edition, West Group, 1999, p.108; see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) 
44 For example, comparing the laws of Oklahoma to California illustrates this contrast. Oklahoma prevents diverting trade, 
whereas California specifically prohibits loss leader selling. Oklahoma courts specifically state that an intent of this law 
is to prevent loss leader sales. See, So-Lo Oil Company, infra note 52. 
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antitrust interpretation is that the conduct must injure the competitive process, but another 
school of thought is that injury to a single competitor is sufficient.46 In Oklahoma, the court 
recently interpreted the law in a manner that is very unfavorable to firms that sell below 
cost. The court issued an injunction against Sam’s Club under the state’s Unfair Sales Act. 
The court reasoned that selling below cost inferred that the defendant substantially lessened 
competition under the statute.47 This interpretation of the law infers that the sale of an item 
below cost alone is sufficient to establish a violation of the state SBC law. Table 1-1 is a 
























                                                                                                                                                 
45 Id at 118. 
46 Samuel L. Perkins, A Place for Fair Competition Acts in Motor Fuel Marketing,  26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 211, 260 (Summer 
1999). 
47 Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Murphy Oil Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4545, 33 (2003) 
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Table 1-1:  
State Sales Below Cost Laws 
 
State Legislation Enacted Repealed Damages Ratailer's Markup
Unconstitutional 
in whole or part
Unconstitutional 
defect remedied
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1461 1937 1982 12% 1941
Arkansas Ar. Stat. § 4-75-201-11 1937 Treble
California
Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17028, 
§ 17019 17044 1935 Treble in 1959 6% in 1953
Colorado Col. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105 1937 1955 1960
Connecticut Ct. St. § 35-27 1949 1969 6%
Hawaii*** Haw. Rev. Stat. § 481-3 1955 Treble 6%
Idaho Idaho Code § 48-401 1939 Treble 6% in 1955
Kansas 50-401 1941 1961 6% 1959
Kentucky Ky. St. § 365-030 1936 Treble 1983
Louisiana La. Rev. St. § 51-422 1942 6%
Maine 10 Me. St. § 1204-A 1939 Treble 6% 1956
Maryland Md. Comm. Law §11-404 1939/    1957 1951 5% 1940 1957
Massachusetts Mass. St. 93§14E 1938 6%
Minnesota Mn. St. § 325D.04 1937 1938 1939
Montana Mt. St. § 30-14-209 1937 Treble
Nebraska Neb. Stat. 59-1201 1905 1972 6%
New Hampshire N.H. Stat. Chapter 358 1941 1977 6% 1948
New Jersey N.J. Stat 56-4-2 1938 1975 6% 1939 1953
North Dakota N.D. St. 51-10-04 1941
Oklahoma 15 Ok. St. §598.1 1941 6%
Oregon
Oregon Stat. 50-656.010- 
646.180 1937 1975 Treble 6%
Pennsylvania 73 Pa. St. §213 1937 4% 1940 1941
Rhode Island R.I. St. §6-13-4 1939 6% 1965
South Carolina S.C. S. §39-3-150 1902
Tennessee Tn. St. §39-3-150 1937 6%
Utah Utah Code 13-5-1 1937 Treble 6%
Virginia Va. Chapter 259 1938 1976 6%
Washington Wash. St. §19.86 1939 1983
West Virginia W.V. St. §47-11A-2 1939 Treble 7%
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. 100.30 1939 6% until 1985
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-4-101 1937
*** Statehood in 1959, 
Act passed in 1939
Source:   
State Legislation
Commercial Clearing House (CCH), Trade Regulation Reporter  
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a. Damages Under the Acts 
 Damages under the state laws also tend to vary drastically.  All jurisdictions at least 
allow injunctive relief and compensatory damages.  However, many of the states replicate 
the federal antitrust damages by requiring the defendant to pay treble damages for a 
violation of the act. This implies that firms are strictly better off suing under state laws than 
federal laws, because plaintiffs can prove violations under the law with greater ease. 
Currently, nine states with SBC laws also allow for treble damages.    
b. Litigation Under the Below Cost Sales Laws 
 The states’ highest courts declared general SBC laws unconstitutional, in whole or 
part, in eleven states. Many courts interpret these acts as violations of Constitutional Due 
Process protections.48 The courts frequently focus on the intent element of the laws with 
respect to constitutional validity.49 In many of the states with SBC laws, selling below cost 
infers intent to harm competitors or injure competition. The act of injuring competitors and 
imposing criminal sanctions usually requires a specific intent to cause that very harm.  
Given that the act alone is possibly beneficial and not per se harmful, or harmful in and of 
itself, the act coupled with intent is what gives rise to a harmful undertaking.50 Courts have 
stated that inferring intent created an impermissible presumption of guilt and violates due 
process protections.51  Many states have dodged this issue by stating that conduct is prima 
                                                 
48 See, Generally, Francis M. Dougherty, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory Provision Prohibiting 
Sales of Commodities Below Cost- Modern Cases, 41 A.L.R. 4th 612 (2000);  Note, State Legislation Prohibiting Sales 
Below Cost, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1142(1939); Oler, Statutory Inhibition against Sales Below Cost 43 Dick. L. Rev. 112 
(1939); Note, Constitutionality of Statute Prohibiting Sales at Less than Cost, 47 Yale L.J. 1201 (1939); Note, Statutory 
Bans Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest Antidote for Big Business, 25 Va. L. Rev., 699 (1939) 
49 Note, Statutory Bans Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest Antidote for Big Business, 25 Va. L. Rev., 699, 704 (1939) 
50 Ibid. 
51 See, Dougherty, supra note 48. 
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facie evidence of intent, which allows the defendant to show intentions other than harming 
competition or competitors.52  
c. Minimum Markup Provisions 
 Twenty-two states with SBC laws require that firms’ price at a stated minimum 
markup above its invoice or average variable costs. While state provisions preventing 
below cost sales all make some accounting for fixed costs, those with minimum markup 
provisions provide a fixed percentage that represents the cost of doing business. Firms are 
permitted to prove that their fixed costs are lower than the minimum markup, however, the 
markup does serve as a basis for initiating a lawsuit. The provision does not alter the 
interpretation of cost, but does allow small firms to form a more concrete basis for 
evaluating rivals costs in the context of a potential lawsuit. 
d. State Fair Trade Acts and Resale Price Maintenance  
 Resale price maintenance is a practice that receives per se treatment under the 
Sherman Act, meaning that resale price maintenance is an antitrust violation without a 
showing of anticompetitive effects. The Supreme Court established this standard in 1911 
with the case Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Park & Sons.53 However, in 1937, the Miller-
Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act allowed states to adopt legislation permitting 
firms to use resale price maintenance practices.54 This form of legislation became known as 
fair trade acts.  
                                                 
52 See e.g. So-Lo Oil Company, Inc. v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 832 P.2d 14 (1992) 
53 Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The Court has crafted exceptions to the resale price 
maintenance doctrine since deciding Dr. Miles. Most notably, the Colgate decision condoned unilateral resale price 
maintenance schemes.  
54 Sidney A. Diamond, Antitrust Problems of Fair Trading, 1 The Antitrust Bulletin 97, 98 (1955). 
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 In 1955, Congress also implemented the McGuire Act55, which allowed states to 
expand on the breadth of the fair trade acts by permitting the use of non-signor clauses. 
These non-signor clauses allowed firms to enter enforceable contracts preventing the sale 
of goods below an agreed upon price. Congress repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and the 
McGuire Act in 1975.56 
 Forty-five states initially enacted fair trade legislation. Since that time, nine states 
either repealed the laws or deemed them unconstitutional, and courts invalidated the non-
signor provisions in nineteen states. Fair trade laws were another form of protectionist 
legislation that states enacted after 1937. I account for the effects of fair trade legislation in 
this dissertation. Resale price maintenance forces firms to compete on non-price 
competition, which should increase the presence of small firms. Omitting the effects of 
these laws may overstate the impact of the SBC laws because the fair trade laws may be 
responsible for some of the small business trends.  
e. Summary of the laws 
The federal laws prohibiting predatory pricing are relatively limited in their 
protection of small businesses. The federal standard requires recoupment of the predator’s 
losses, in addition to the dangerous probability of gaining monopoly power, to find a 
potential predator liable of an offense.  This standard may be too burdensome for any 
plaintiff to prove, given that the firm is still viable.   
By contrast, the state laws are sure to find violations where federal laws are 
sufficient and even when they are not.  By their construction, these laws protect 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 89 Stat. 631 (1955). 
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competitors in addition to competition, and sometimes carry damages equal to the federal 
laws. With some notable exceptions, the state laws are likely to create more thriving small 
businesses in the retail market. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economists have looked at issues related to both predatory pricing and the state 
counterparts. Authors' employ various techniques to evaluate the below cost pricing laws, 
depending on the issue they examine. While the Sherman Act made both attempted 
monopolization and predation illegal, the economic literature regarding predatory pricing 
pre-dates the modern legal treatment of the laws.57 This early literature regarding predatory 
pricing tended to focus on specific tests for detecting predatory pricing58, or the rationality 
and likelihood of such conduct.59 By contrast, states created the legal rules for sales below 
cost laws before the topic received attention in the literature. The literature that followed 
the enactment and enforcement of the state laws primarily related to their 
constitutionality.60  
The Court now has a well-established legal standard for predatory pricing cases, 
however the economic literature is still mixed on the proper treatment of predatory pricing 
claims. The literature of predatory pricing also vastly differs in regards to how authors 
choose to hypothesize on the rationality and existence of the conduct. The literature 
                                                 
57 See generally, Areeda, supra note 19; Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chic. 
L.Rev. 263 (1981); William Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A  Policy for Prevention of Predatory 
Pricing, 89 Yale L.J. 1 (1979).  
58 See generally, Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975). 
59 See generally, Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chic. L.Rev. 263 (1981) 
60 See, Note, State Legislation Prohibiting Sales Below Cost, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1142(1939); Oler, Statutory Inhibition 
against Sales Below Cost 43 Dick. L. Rev. 112 (1939); Note, Constitutionality of Statute Prohibiting Sales at Less than 
Cost, 47 Yale L.J. 1201 (1939); Note, Statutory Bans Against Selling Below Cost: The Latest Antidote for Big Business, 
25 Va. L. Rev., 699 (1939) 
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pertaining to the state laws banning sales below cost is relatively limited. There are few 
publications discussing the legal or economic significance of these state statutes.61  
Articles regarding the antitrust laws or state sales below cost laws focus either on 
the legal significance of the laws or the economic problems relating to laws. The literature 
regarding the state laws generally addresses three themes: 1) the construction of the 
differing state laws and their treatment by the courts; 2) The theoretical benefits or harms 
stemming from the below-cost sales laws. 3) Empirical tests performed to determine the 
effect of these laws. The works focusing on predatory pricing are more diverse than those 
analyzing the state laws. These papers tend to concentrate on either legal or economic 
issues stemming from the federal law. For purposes of this study, the predatory pricing 
literature may be grouped into three general themes: 1) legal analysis of the federal 
predatory pricing laws; 2) case studies regarding the existence of predatory pricing; 3) 
theoretical analyses examining the existence and rationality of predatory conduct. This 
chapter is broken into two sections. Section 1 summarizes the literature pertaining to state 
SBC laws. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature on predatory pricing.  
A. State Sales Below Cost Laws 
1. Empirical Tests of State Below-Cost Sales Laws 
There are four primary works on empirical tests of state sales below cost laws. 
Michael J. Houston was the first author to test the effectiveness of the minimum markup 
laws by examining the impact of these laws on the viability of small retail firms.62 Houston 
                                                 
61 Rod W. Anderson and Ronald N Johnson, Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline, Review 
of Industrial Organization 14 189-204, (1999) p. 200. 
62 Michael J. Houston, Minimum Markup Laws: An Empirical Assessment, Journal of Retailing, Vol. 57, No. 4, 98-113 
(Winter 1981). 
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chose to select a variety of retail industries to empirically study the effect of the laws, 
which included all retail stores combined, grocery stores, apparel and accessory stores, 
variety stores, automobile dealers, furniture stores, and liquor stores. He performed a cross-
sectional regression using observations from the 1977 Census of Retail Trade with three 
different dependent variables to measure small businesses; the number of single-proprietor 
and partnership forms of business in a state; single proprietorships and partnerships as a 
proportion of total establishments; and the number of merchant bankruptcies. The control 
variables were the minimum markup laws, total population, population density, 
urbanization, disposable income per household, and the ratio of total retail sales to total 
disposable personal income. He only used the total population variable with respect to the 
models utilizing total establishments. The population variable was positively and 
significantly related to the total number of small businesses in every test. Population 
density was negatively related to the number and proportion of small businesses and 
frequently significant, and disposable income was usually inversely related to the number 
and proportion of small businesses, but rarely significant. His measure of retail sales was 
most often positively correlated with the small business variable, but infrequently 
significant.  
Houston concluded that minimum markup laws do not have an impact on the 
number or proportion of small firms, but his empirical tests do provide some contradicting 
evidence. It appears that the minimum markup law in his study was positively related with 
both his measures of small firms in each industry, as well aggregate retail sales. The only 
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exception was his regression using the proportion of small firms in the liquor store market. 
Additionally, in his regression on aggregate retail sales, Houston rejected that the minimum 
markup provision was related to the number of small firms at a 1% significance level. His 
results illustrate that minimum markup laws increase the total number and proportion of 
small firms for aggregate retail trade by 5.7% and 9.1% respectively, but those figures were 
not statistically significant. Additionally, the markup laws increased the total number of 
small grocers and automotive dealers by 9.9% and 12.5%, and the proportion of small 
automotive dealers and furniture stores by 20% and 8.7%.63  
My analysis differs from Houston’s tests in several respects. First, he used dummy 
variables to account for the 26 states with minimum markup laws, so the minimum markup 
variable equals one for 26 states in his sample.64 However, he used data for the year 1977 
and at that time only 24 states had active sales below cost laws in effect. The empirical tests 
performed in his article made no distinction between any of the state laws discussed in 
Chapter 1 that could affect their impact on small businesses. Houston used observations 
from the 1970’s in a cross-sectional format, but these results do not capture the impact of 
these laws on a state over time. More importantly, the 1970’s reflect a period of time before 
the Court scrutinized the federal pertaining to predatory pricing laws. The case law 
condemning predatory pricing as a basis for protection did not become prevalent until the 
1980’s, which implies that small firms still had a viable remedy in the form of the federal 
laws at the time of his analysis. Additionally, delineating small firms on the basis of sole-
                                                 
63 Ibid. at 107-109. 
64 Ibid. at. 104. 
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proprietorships and partnerships is problematic. While these indicators may in fact be 
predominantly comprised of small firms, many small firms are also likely to be 
incorporated. The most problematic aspect of that fact is that only the largest firms should 
use predation as a profit-maximizing alternative, so it would be more reasonable to label 
large firms as small firms than vice versa. While his article does lay a reasonable 
foundation for analyzing the effectiveness of these laws, it does leave an opening for a 
more comprehensive evaluation of these laws. 
In 1999, Rod Anderson and Ronald Johnson attempted to empirically assess the 
significance of below-cost sales laws on retail gasoline outlets.65 Similar to Houston’s 
approach, Anderson and Johnson attempted to empirically test the impact of the laws on 
small businesses. However, they also tested the impact of the laws on retail margins as 
well. In their first regression, the authors used retail gasoline margins from March 1992 
through December 1993, for three different categories as a dependent variable. The three 
categories included cities with a gasoline-specific sales below cost law, cities with only a 
general sales below cost law and cities with neither law.66 The regressions were performed 
using OLS and a cross-sectionally correlated, time-wise autoregressive model correcting 
for heteroskedastic errors. The explanatory variables used in their regressions were dummy 
variables for gasoline specific sales below-cost laws and general sales below-cost laws, 
prohibitions on self-service, population density, property values, real wages, seasonal 
                                                 
65 Rod W. Anderson and Ronald N Johnson, Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline, Review 
of Industrial Organization 14 189-204, 1999 
66 Ibid.  
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dummies, and a time trend.67 Their results indicate that the gasoline specific sales below-
cost law was significant and positive, while the general law was not statistically significant 
in accounting for an increase in retail margins of gasoline. The gasoline specific law had a 
coefficient of .64, and the general SBC law had a coefficient of .21, but was not statistically 
significant. The authors’ second test involved testing whether the sales below cost laws had 
an effect on the total number of gasoline stations in a given state. They once again found 
that the gasoline specific laws had a significant effect on the number of retail outlets, but 
the general law again did not have a significant effect. The gasoline specific laws increased 
the total number of gasoline stations by 572.13 at a 10% significance level in a one tailed 
test, and the general SBC law decreased the number of establishments by 252.93 at a 
statistically insignificant level. Unlike Houston’s model, the data does account for a time 
period after significant barriers to predation claims were established, however, their model 
does not account for differences in the laws. Their model also does not delineate a small 
firm or large firm, as it simply estimates the total number of establishments. 
A recent article by James Skidmore, James Peltier, and James Alm does attempt to 
measure the impact of state SBC laws on both gasoline markups and the presence of 
gasoline stations.68 The authors utilize the gasoline specific SBC laws to determine whether 
the laws affect retail markups, the retail price, or the percent markup. Similar to this study, 
the authors use a panel data set, but their data ranges from 1983-2002. The functional form 
of the regression was a fixed affects model corrected for heteroskedasticity and auto-
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 James Skidmore, James Peltier, and James Alm, Do State Motor Fuel Sales-Below-Cost Laws Lower Prices, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 57 (2005) pp. 189-211. 
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correlation. They found that the presence of a specific SBC law decreased the dependent 
variables of retail price, markup, and percent markup by .665, .645, and .006 respectively, 
at the 5% level for every test. The implications of these tests were that the laws reduced 
market power and prices. However, the results did not withstand the test of time, as prices 
later returned to pre-legislation environment levels. The authors included a comprehensive 
set of control variables including: a variable for log length of the SBC enactment, 
wholesale price, population, population density, elderly population, vehicles and drivers per 
capita, per capita income, heating degree days, a dummy variable for reformulated gasoline 
where federal law requires its use, average annual retail wage, and general SBC law.  
Similar to my analysis, the authors also examine the effect of a minimum markup 
provision. However, their results illustrate that the states without a minimum markup 
provision tended to result in lower prices and markups and were statistically significant. 
The law without markup provisions had coefficients of -1.432 and -1.203 on the retail price 
and markup, respectively. The laws with markups had coefficient values of -.377 and -.434 
on the retail price and markup respectively. This result is not consistent with my 
expectations that markup provisions will increase the viability of the law.  
The authors also tested the affect of market structure on the law. They used data 
from 1983-1997 on the total number of establishments, 1-4 employee establishments, and 
establishments with greater than 5 employees. Their results report the coefficients in logs 
on the SBC law. The coefficients were .02 with respect to total establishments, .011 for 1-4 
employee establishments, which was deemed insignificant, and .039 for establishments 
with greater than five employees. The results show that SBC laws preserve the total 
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number of establishments over time, but they conclude that the SBC laws are most likely to 
protect medium and larger businesses rather than the smallest firms.  
2. Legal Construction and Application of State Below-Cost Sales Laws 
A few authors address the issue of sales below cost laws in a legal context. The 
cumulative findings are summarized in Chapter 1 pertaining to sales below cost laws. The 
primary sources for construction and application of the state laws comes from the state 
statutes or case law interpreting the same. I briefly discuss the primary articles pertaining 
to SBC laws from a legal perspective.                
The most in-depth article covering the sales below-cost laws is an article by Francis 
M. Dougherty.69 Dougherty discusses the common problems that sales below-cost laws 
have faced in the courts. Many of the state laws were constructed with the purpose of 
preventing loss leader practices and saving small businesses that cannot afford to compete 
by pricing below cost. The article’s key contribution to the literature is the detailed survey 
that it performs with respect to the case law. The article comments on key cases and themes 
that have caused state below cost sales statutes to become invalidated. Among the most 
successful challenges to the state laws include violations of due process of law, vagueness 
and conduct that created an impermissible presumption of guilt. The article evaluates which 
state laws may require a heavier burden on plaintiff’s seeking to recover in a case against a 
firm pricing below its cost. 
                                                 
69 Francis M. Dougherty, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory Provision Prohibiting Sales of 
Commodities Below Cost- Modern Cases, 41 A.L.R. 4th 612 (1985) 
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Samuel L. Perkins also performed a relatively in-depth analysis of state below-cost 
sales laws.70 While Perkins’ article was centered on state gasoline laws, the article did 
provide an appendix summarizing each state’s below-cost sales law. The article provides 
the citation to the laws in addition to the key provisions of each state’s law and the key 
cases that were decided with respect to each state. 
3. Theoretical Implications of Below-Cost Sales Laws 
SBC laws have implications on both predatory pricing and loss leader selling 
conduct. The Federal Trade Commission issued a letter to Delegate McDonnell of the 
Virginia House of Delegates regarding the problems associated with below-cost sales 
laws.71 The letter suggested that these laws have the potential to have anticompetitive 
effects and the pro-competitive benefits of the laws are merely duplicative of the federal 
predatory pricing laws.72 The FTC specifically disagreed with the laws for a several 
reasons. 1) The federal laws already address anti-competitive pricing; 2) Scholars 
acknowledge that predatory pricing is a rare event; 3) Price cutting that is beneficial to 
consumers would be punished 4) The laws may have a tendency to increase price. 
 Areeda and Hovenkamp did discuss the practice of loss leader selling in their 
treatise on antitrust law.73 In particular, they discuss why loss leader practices do not merit 
federal antitrust attention. “True loss leader pricing is not predatory, assuming that the 
                                                 
70 Samuel L. Perkins, A Place for Fair Competition Acts in Motor Fuel Marketing,  26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 211 (Summer 1999) 
71 http://www.ftc.gov/be/V020011.htm 
72 Ibid. 
73 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law : An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 
(18 Volume Set), (1995) ¶742f. 
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reasonably anticipated incremental revenue impact of the aggressive pricing is positive.”74 
They acknowledge that loss leaders are even common in the grocery industry.75 
William H. Jordan strongly criticized state laws forbidding below cost sales.76 He 
claims that the inconsistency between the federal and state statutes creates uncertainty in 
the business environment and can stifle pro-competitive activity.77 Jordan uses the Wal-
Mart case in Arkansas as a key example of how inconsistencies in the laws have the 
potential to create problematic results. Under the federal standards established by Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), the plaintiff must 
be able to show that the defendant could recoup its losses later with monopoly profits. 
Applying the current predatory pricing standard to the Wal-Mart case in Arkansas would 
not have yielded a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs because Wal-Mart could not have 
recouped its losses by later raising the price of that product, according to the author, and 
Wal-Mart did not have any losses to recoup because it sold the products as loss leaders and 
never incurred a loss in the store to recover.78 
B. Federal Antitrust Laws 
1. Legal Standards for Federal Predatory Pricing Claims 
I address the legal standards for federal predatory pricing claims in chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, and provide a detailed discussion of the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., citing Lormar v. Kroger Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. ¶62,498 (S.D. Ohio). This fact, if indeed true should support the 
fact that loss leaders are not as common in states with sales below cost laws. Retail margins in grocery stores should be 
higher, and small firms should be more prevalent, unless of course, small stores frequently sell loss leaders as well. 
76 William H. Jordan, Comment: Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: The Problem of State “Sales Below Cost 
Statutes”, 44 Emory L.J. 267 (1995) 
77 Ibid. at 268. 
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Act. The two significant legal standards stem from Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). In Matsushita, the Court relied heavily on empirical 
studies by John McGee and Ronald Koller, who performed studies showing that past firms 
in violation of predatory pricing likely did not resort to predatory tactics.79 Since the 
decision in Brooke, no claim brought strictly on grounds of price predation has been 
successful at the federal level.  
2. Case Studies on the Existence of Predatory Pricing 
Ronald Koller sought to conduct an empirical test for predation.80 Koller’s 
empirical test came in the form of a case study analysis. Koller states that a firm using 
predatory tactics is seeking to advance one of two goals. 1) Drive the rival from the 
business so that the predator can raise price in the absence of competition. 2) Lower the 
value of the rival such that the predator can acquire the assets of the rival and achieve 
monopoly power. Koller researched predation cases in which he could get data or the court 
provided data, such that he could determine the real predation issues from mere complaints 
by rivals. Koller estimates that out of the 26 cases he found suitable for examination, in 
only a handful of these did the prey of the attack falter. In addition, when the prey did go 
under, it was usually the result of an acquisition.   
Koller also states that in only a few instances did the market actually suffer from 
these predatory attempts. In my opinion Koller’s analysis is not extremely reliable. First, 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Patrick Bolton and Joseph F. Brodley, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239, 2243 
(August 2000). 
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the analysis is subjective because it attempts to evaluate predatory pricing after the fact 
based on court documentation. Second, victims of predation bring claims before they are 
financially insolvent. His sample includes firms that used the courts as a pre-emptive strike 
against the anti-competitive practices. Third, he only had data to examine a very small 
portion of all the existing predation cases. Thus, I feel his analysis may not be a strong 
representation for predatory pricing.  
John McGee performed an extensive case study of the Standard Oil case.81 McGee 
noted that Standard Oil acquired 223 related companies and closed down at least 75 oil 
refineries. Based on the premise that Standard acquired its dominant position through 
mergers and acquisitions, he examined whether predatory pricing was the motivating factor 
initiating specific instances of merger or acquisition. He checked the record for testimony 
about every refinery Standard bought, and also checked for instances of local price-cutting 
involving firms Standard did not acquire. He concluded that predatory pricing did not force 
any refiner to sell out or depress the value of a refiner. He also stated that Standard’s 
purchase terms were often very good for the acquired company. McGee’s analysis is 
consistent with much of the predation literature doubting the feasibility of predatory 
pricing.   
3. Economic Assessment of the Probability and Practicality of Predatory Pricing  
Areeda and Turner performed a comprehensive analysis examining the possible 
pricing strategies of a dominant firm and which strategies should be considered to imply 
                                                                                                                                                 
80 Ronald H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing; An Empirical Study, Antitrust Law & Economics Review, 4 
(Summer 1971), pp. 110- 121. 
81 John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, The Journal of Law and Economics, 137 (1958), 
137-159. 
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predatory behavior.82 These tests also prove useful in ascertaining whether a legitimate 
claim of predatory pricing exists and should be enforced and will serve as a useful 
benchmark when analyzing predatory pricing and below cost sales in the context of the 
model. 
 When a firm sets price equal to its average cost, the firm is just “breaking-even”.  
Simply because a firm is able to meet their average costs, however, does not imply that the 
firm is employing profit-maximizing behavior. The condition for profit-maximizing 
behavior means that the firm’s revenue from selling the last unit produced is just equal to 
the cost to produce the good. In other words, the firm’s marginal revenue is equal to its 
marginal cost. A policy whereby a firm prices below its marginal cost would lead to a 
strong presumption of predatory pricing. This does not demonstrate rational profit-
maximizing behavior because the firm could increase its profits by simply reducing the 
amount of output it produced. 
 A legal claim of predatory pricing would be inappropriate when the firm is able to 
maintain a “break-even” profit, whether or not the firm intentionally priced below marginal 
cost in response to a rival’s presence. This pricing policy would tend to have an effect of 
eliminating less efficient rivals more than injuring competition. Another characteristic of 
this behavior is that it ultimately benefits the consumer. A firm that is able to maintain zero 
or positive profits can survive indefinitely. The firm would not have to recoup its losses 
through future monopoly prices. The fact that the firm can sustain the price level creates a 
positive environment for consumers, because future monopoly prices are the harm of 
                                                 
82 Areeda, Phillip and Turner, Donald, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975). 
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predatory pricing. Therefore, prices below marginal cost should not be the appropriate 
standard for granting antitrust relief when the firm is covering its average cost. 
 A situation where the predator is producing beyond where his plant functions most 
efficiently can immediately be dismissed as anti-competitive conduct. This result is clear 
since at such high levels of production the marginal cost will exceed the firm’s average 
cost. This production policy is not an effective measure to eliminate equally efficient rivals 
or entrants, who may easily restrict their output to make greater profits at the higher price.  
This scenario is a clear and distinct form of favorable price competition.    
 Only the scenario when the dominant firm is producing at a level where marginal 
cost is less than average cost will tend to eliminate rivals. Such a scenario exists when the 
firm is operating with excess capacity. In this instance, an equally efficient rival might be 
displaced from the market because it has fewer resources than the dominant firm does. 
However, a policy forcing the dominant firm to increase production would entail negative 
social effects. First, using additional capacity when the market currently exhibits excess 
capacity would waste social resources. Second, and more importantly, competitive markets 
would be undermined if courts adopted rules that punished firms for acting within rational 
profit-maximizing behavior.   
 This is the situation where predatory pricing is evident. While Easterbrook83 
contends that predatory pricing is not realistic, a firm pricing below marginal cost is acting 
counter to short-run profit-maximizing principles and creates a serious likelihood that rivals 
will be ousted from the market. The rival’s exit from the market will not be a socially 
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optimal result because their firm’s failure is not the result of efficiency of the predator. In 
addition, valuable social resources are wasted in the process when the firm’s marginal cost 
exceeds the value of what is produced.   
 The exception to this rule should be the situation where the predator manages to 
cover average costs. Areeda and Turner argue that even though average cost pricing does 
not demonstrate social optimal output levels, the firm is acting in a manner to remain 
profitable. Pricing below marginal cost is wasteful, regardless of the average cost of 
production, but the practice does not seem to foster anti-competitive behavior.   
 Despite considering marginal cost as the appropriate yardstick for measuring 
predatory pricing, Areeda and Turner recognized the difficulty in applying a marginal cost 
rule.  The incremental cost of making and selling the last unit sold by a firm cannot be 
readily identified by typical business accounts. They adopted an average variable cost 
standard as a surrogate for the marginal cost test. This test infers predatory conduct when a 
firm prices below its average variable cost. The reason average variable cost may be a good 
approximation of marginal cost is that it tends to measure cost incrementally, similar to 
marginal cost.  However, it will not yield the precise profit-maximizing behavior of a firm. 
Joskow and Klevorick do not agree with the premise that only sales below average 
variable cost should be a proxy for predatory pricing.84 They argue that while a price cut 
below average variable cost in response to entry represents a present sacrifice for a longer-
run monopoly gain and is obviously predatory, any price cut between a firm’s average total 
cost and average variable cost may also represent predatory action. Average variable cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
83 Frank Easterbrook, “Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies”, 48 U. Chic. L.Rev. 263 at 336. 
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should be the first standard evaluated because any price below average variable cost will 
always be below average total cost as well. However, if the dominant firm meets the 
average variable cost standard, the courts should inquire into the nature of average total 
cost.  Barring the dominant firm setting price equal to marginal cost, a price below average 
total cost may indicate a firm’s willingness top eliminate rivals from the market.   
William Baumol provides a framework that sounds theoretically pleasing, but 
would be an impossibility to implement effectively.85 Baumol would allow firms to set 
prices freely.  However, if a firm were ousted from the market subsequent to a dominant 
firm’s price cutting behavior, the predator would be forced to maintain the price 
indefinitely. The only justification for a firm to raise prices would be to match increased 
costs of the goods sold by the predator. While this idea is novel and an interesting concept, 
it cannot be applied soundly in practice. Regulatory agencies would have to be created 
solely for the purpose of monitoring firms pricing practices. In addition, sensitive 
determinations would have to be made frequently to determine the specific reason for any 
and every firm failure.  Additionally, sales promotions by firms would be a discouraged 
practice for fear of the potential price freeze that could result if a rival happens to falter. 
The soundest policy would be to strike a balance between the federal and state laws. A 
policy that unequivocally abolished incentives to use predatory tactics, while not interfering 
with legitimate competition seems to be the key to establishing an efficient market. 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Joskow, P. and A. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213 (1979).   
85 William Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A  Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 Yale L.J. 1 
(1979). 
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 The remainder of the literature pertaining to the rationality of predatory is 
voluminous. Theories proposing predatory pricing as a strategy implement various 
arguments from establishing a reputation for toughness, predation for merger, and the long-
purse story.86 Opponents frequently present alternative methods of acquiring monopoly 
power that are superior to predatory pricing. The most common of these strategies is that 
mergers yield preferable results to predation.87  
 My conclusion from the literature is that predatory pricing is a practice that yields 
an ambiguous result with respect to its rationality. What is clear is that federal courts have 
made the claim increasingly difficult to prosecute since the Matsushita case in 1986. 
Additionally, the state laws do overlap in their application to predatory pricing and also 
deter loss leader practices that are not condemned by federal legislation. The effects of the 
state SBC laws has mixed empirical results to date.   
                                                 
86 See generally, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 27, (1982) 280-312; Kreps, D. and R. Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 27, (1982), 253-279; Yamey, B., Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 15, (1972), 129-142; Tesler, L., Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, Journal of Law and Economics, 
9, (1966), 259-277.  
87 Bork, R., The Antitrust Paradox, (1988), New York; Basic Books. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SALES BELOW COST LAWS 
A. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop theoretical models that illustrate the 
impact of sales below cost laws on small businesses. I will also use these models to depict 
the requisite market structure necessary for sales below cost laws to be effective. 
Additionally, this chapter provides analysis on how behavior among firms will change 
based on the types of goods that are sold. This analysis will provide a basis for crafting 
testable hypotheses that will be examined in chapter 4.  
Much of the economic literature on predatory pricing is game theoretic analyses 
pertaining to the rationality of predatory pricing. 88  My interest is not whether firms will 
desire to engage in predatory pricing, but the impact of state SBC laws on potential 
predatory behavior. Obviously, if predatory or loss leader pricing is not a rational strategy, 
the laws enacted to deter such conduct are effectively moot and should have no impact on 
the viability of small firms.  
                                                 
88 The most prominent of these theories are the articles pertaining to predation by reputation. My analysis assumes that the 
predator may find predatory pricing rational or not, and firms’ predicate their strategic decisions based on that 
assumption. Since this analysis simply assumes that predatory pricing may be rational, the reasons explaining such 
behavior are not relevant except to explain why such conduct may occur. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Predation, 
Reputation and Entry Deterrence, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, 280-312 (1982); David M. Kreps and Robert 
Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, 253-279 (1982). 
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Another body of literature relevant to this chapter is game theoretic models of 
litigation.89 The models examine the choices of suing or refraining from suing, and to 
litigate or settle a claim. The articles effectively serve to establish parameters that must be 
considered when crafting the structure of the games that I present in this chapter, but none 
of this literature is directly applicable to evaluating the effects of these laws.  
The most common scenario examined in the predation literature is whether a 
dominant incumbent firm would chose to eliminate rivals or chill entry into the market by 
employing a below cost pricing strategy. While this scenario is relevant to my inquiry, 
evaluating only this solitary circumstance would fail capture the breadth of activity that 
predation or below cost sales laws condemn, because that scenario ignores the rudimentary 
rationale for states implementing below cost sales laws. In addition to acts of predatory 
pricing, sales below cost laws also serve to prohibit loss leader pricing. Firms often initiate 
this pricing pattern to gain market share for reasons unrelated to driving competitors out of 
business. Loss leaders can serve as a means to attract new customers, and increase sales of 
other products the store offers. Loss leader pricing often increases consumer surplus, such 
that it draws no attention from federal antitrust legislation; however, it may have the same 
effect on small businesses as predatory pricing. 
Large multi-product firms competing with small retailers that possess a much less 
diversified inventory could have an opportunity to eliminate smaller rivals by 
                                                 
89 I.P.L P’ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol.14 no. 2, (Autumn, 
1983), 539-550. P’ng uses a game theoretic setting to explain whether plaintiffs will bring suit, settle, or proceed to trial 
under assumptions of incomplete information and no litigation costs if the plaintiff does not proceed to trial. Under these 
assumptions, the plaintiff will always file a lawsuit. This analysis should not impact the outcome in these models as the 
plaintiff could initiate a suit under either the state or federal law if a potential plaintiff would always sue without regard 
to defendant’s liability, litigation costs, or bad faith damages for the defendant. 
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implementing a loss leader strategy. This strategy could actually present a more harmful 
scenario for small firms than predatory pricing. Large diversified firms implementing loss 
leader strategies can minimize or avoid the initial sacrifice inherent in a predatory pricing 
scheme. This allows the dominant firm to rationally price below cost perpetually, and it 
also reduces the risk to large firms of new entrants intervening with its recoupment process.   
Dominant firms implementing loss-leader strategies typically fall within the 
purview of state below cost sales laws.  One of the stated intents of the state laws is to 
prohibit loss leader pricing. This infers that state laws do afford small firms an additional 
layer of protection that federal antitrust laws do not.  
My intent in creating the game theoretic models in this chapter was to create a set of 
player strategies that could potentially generate predatory pricing or below cost sales 
lawsuits. One model is not sufficient to accurately capture the implications of interactions 
between firms when one firm elects a strategy of selling below cost, because a firm can 
intend for such conduct to be predatory or a loss leader. Therefore, I examined two types of 
models pertaining to below cost sales. First, I solve for a sub-game perfect equilibrium 
when the dominant firm may employ a predatory pricing strategy. The purpose of this 
game is to ascertain whether states that implement SBC laws more effectively deter 
predatory pricing than states without the same legislation. Second, I solve for a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium when a dominant firm may choose a loss leader strategy. This game 
examines whether states that enact SBC legislation protect small firms by deterring loss 
leaders.  
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B. The Models 
1. The Players and a Summary of the Games  
 I use a duopoly market structure with a dominant firm and a weaker small firm. 
Unlike existing game theory that assumes the dominant firm is the incumbent, this analysis 
assumes that the dominant firm could either be the incumbent or the entrant, as the value of 
the model is in the comparison between outcomes when states have SBC laws or do not 
have such legislation.  
I impose certain characteristics on the dominant firm. The model assumes that only 
the dominant firm can be a predator, but both firms can use loss leaders. Predatory pricing 
strategies are not rational when the prey possesses greater financial resources than the 
predator, so I exclude this possibility.90 This study also assumes that the predator’s type 
(whether strong or weak) is known.91 I make this assumption based on the fact that any 
firm engaging in predatory conduct must have sufficient resources to credibly pursue such 
a strategy. Firms possessing such financial strength are likely to be large corporations, 
whose financial data is revealed in reports to shareholders as well as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  
The models in this paper are one-stage extensive form games with two firms.  
The purpose of each model is to depict how below cost sales laws impact a large firm’s 
ability to price below cost and a small firm’s ability to compete in the market under those 
circumstances. This chapter presents two different models to illustrate the effect of these 
                                                 
90 This assumption is predicated on the deep pocket theory, which explains that greater financial resources may provide 
one explanation for predatory pricing. See generally, Tesler, L., Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 9: 259-277, (1966). 
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laws on both dominant and weaker firms. One of the games examines a situation where the 
dominant firm has the option to accommodate the smaller firm’s presence in the market or 
engage in predatory pricing practices. For simplicity, I refer to this game as the predation 
game. The other game is similar in examining the effect of the below cost sales; however, 
this game evaluates firm behavior when the dominant firm can choose to sell products as 
loss leaders. I will refer to this game as the loss leader game. I also present diagrams for 
each game to illustrate potential outcomes when the state SBC suit is an alternative and 
when it is not. 
The premise is the same in both games. Each game examines two basic questions 
with respect to state sales below cost laws. First, do the state laws extend additional 
protection to small businesses beyond the federal antitrust laws? Second, even if the state 
laws provide a penumbra from below cost sales that their federal counterparts do not, are 
they likely to increase the viability of small firms?  
 In addition to simply solving the games, I will then use the model to analyze 
outcomes when certain assumptions underlying the models are changed. In particular, I will 
examine how differing market characteristics affect the outcome of the games; whether the 
type of good being sold below cost alters participants’ strategies, and whether symmetric 
information regarding costs alters the outcome of the game. I will use some of the results 
from this chapter as hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 4 of this paper.   
                                                                                                                                                 
91 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, 
280-312 (1982); David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic 
Theory, Vol. 27, 253-279 (1982). 
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2. Player Strategies in the Predation Game 
Each player has a distinct set of strategies that are dependent on the whether firms 
are playing the predation game or loss leader game. The strategies are almost identical, 
with the exception that the dominant firm will make a decision between predation and 
accommodation in the predation game, or a decision between loss leading and 
accommodation in the loss leader game. The dominant firm's conduct remains the same of 
pricing below cost in either game. The distinction between predation and loss leader selling 
is a difference in the dominant firm’s intent and its desired outcome. 
The predation game is most reflective of the economic literature on the subject of 
predatory pricing. Figure 3-1 illustrates the game where a small firm can sue under either 
the federal law or the state SBC law. In this game, the dominant firm makes the first 
decision to either accommodate the small firm, or begin selling below cost in order to drive 
the small firm out of business. The game ends if the dominant firm accommodates the 
small firm’s entry. If the dominant firm elects to predate on the small firm, the small firm 
will be faced with a decision to sue under federal predatory pricing laws, the state sales 
below cost laws, or refrain from suing. The game ends if the entrant does not initiate a 
lawsuit. If the entrant sues under either the federal or state regime, a move by nature 
determines the outcome of the lawsuit and ends the game.   
Figure 3-2 illustrates a version of the predation game when the small firm does not 
have the alternative to sue under the state SBC law. If the dominant firm chooses a 
predatory pricing strategy, the small firm must sue under the antitrust laws or forbear from 
suing. The other aspects of the game are identical to the version I present in Figure 3-1.  




















































































3. Payoffs in the Predation Game 
 The primary goal in crafting outcomes for the various games was to design payoffs 
that accurately reflect results both dominant firms and incumbents can expect when pricing 
below cost and litigation are viable alternatives. The principal concern in designing the 
payoffs is that firms only receive benefits from predatory pricing in subsequent periods; 
however, the payoffs result from one period of strategic interaction between firms and 
litigation outcomes yield a current period payoff.   
 The best alternative is utilize a static one period model and allow the payoffs in this 
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literature addressing collusive behavior in support of this payoff structure. Collusion does 
differ from predatory pricing in that benefits from collusion begin to accrue in the first 
period the firms begin to collude. However, a firm’s decision to collude or cheat on an 
agreement is congruent with a predator’s decision because the firm must account for the 
future consequences of its present strategy. If firms are given the opportunity to collude in a 
duopoly model, the firms will adhere to their agreement only if the discounted future 
profits from collusion exceed the present near-monopoly profits a firm would garner from 
cheating. This result assumes that firms will revert to marginal cost pricing if either firm 
deviates from the collusive strategy. Representing this result mathematically, the firms will 











 This result illustrates that firms must have payoffs extending into the future for 
collusion to be a rational strategy. The concept of predatory pricing is akin to collusive 
behavior in this respect. Firms realize the benefits from predatory pricing in the future, and 
that future value is influenced by such factors such as possible future entry, the interest rate, 
and industry growth. I decided to treat the payoffs similar to cooperative games in this 
respect as a result.92  
 The notations I use in the predatory pricing game are as follows: 
 M- Current period monopoly profits.  
A- Current period profits from accommodation. 
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f- Fixed costs required to compete in the market. 
l- Litigation costs of bringing or defending a federal or state lawsuit. For simplicity, 
I assume that both the predator and prey’s litigation costs are equal. 
δ- The discount factor. In the majority of situations I examine in the following 
games, the discount factor is equal to 
r+1
1 , where r is the interest rate. The only 
exception is when the discount factor is applicable to a dominant firm engaging in 
predatory pricing. In this instance, the discount factor is equal to 
r+1
1 *e, where e is 
the probability of entry in future periods. This assumption is necessary to account 
for future entry into the market by other firms, as future entry is the primary 
limitation to recouping predatory investments.  
γ- Damages attributable to predatory pricing. It is equal to the damage to smaller 
firms, which is the current period accommodation profits plus the entrant’s fixed 
costs, or A+f. 
k- A variable that equals 1 if a state SBC law has treble damages and 0 if it does 
not. 
α- The dominant firm’s cost of eliminating the smaller firm in the first period. α is 
always negative as a result. 
β- The dominant firm’s current period profits from loss leader selling. 
ε- The smaller firm's current profits when the dominant firm utilizes loss leaders.  
                                                                                                                                                 
92 Luis Cabral, Introduction to Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 2000, 128-131. Ordover and Saloner used a similar 
payoff structure to analyze predatory behavior. Ordover and Saloner, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier 
Science Publishing, 1992, 551-556. 
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µ- The probability that a small firm is successful in a federal predatory pricing 
lawsuit. This is essentially the value assigned to nature’s move if the small firm 
sues under the federal antitrust laws. 
φ- The probability that a small firm is successful in a state SBC lawsuit. This is 
essentially the value assigned to nature’s move if the small firm sues under the SBC 
laws. 
In this game, I accounted for both dominant firm and small firm profits under a 
variety of outcomes. If the dominant firm accommodates the small firm at the initial 
decision node, both firms get accommodation profits of A/(1-δ). If the dominant firm 
utilizes a predatory pricing strategy, each firm has five potential outcomes: 1) Sue under 
the federal law win; 2) sue under the federal law and lose; 3) sue under the state SBC law 
and win; 4) sue under the SBC law and lose; 5) forbear from suing.   
The small firm can sue under the federal antitrust laws and lose with a probability 
of 1-µ, which yields profits of (-f-l). This payoff represents the loss of both the small firm’s 
fixed investment and litigation costs. The payoff to the dominant firm if the small firm files 
and loses a federal antitrust suit is as follows. The dominant firm will incur litigation 
expenses because both the federal and state laws require defendants to pay their own 
litigation costs if the plaintiff is unsuccessful.93 The dominant firm will also incur the 
expense of the initial predatory period (α).94 Following the initial predatory period, the 
dominant firm will garner monopoly profits in future periods. This means that the dominant 
                                                 
93 Litigation expenses may be awarded to defendants if the plaintiff brought the lawsuit in bad faith. I assume that all 
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs are in good faith.  
94 α is equal to the price times quantity at the below cost price. Thus, α is always negative. 
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A . This payoff is the result of several factors. Under the federal antitrust laws, 
litigation costs are recoverable by a successful plaintiff. The small firm will not incur 
litigation costs as a result. I assume the small firm will recover its actual damages, which 
include the current period’s fixed costs and the current period’s accommodation profits. 
This puts the small firm back in the same position as the solution where the dominant firm 
accommodates the entry.  In addition, the federal antitrust laws compensate successful 
plaintiffs with treble damages. This means that the total award by the court will be 3γ. 
Since the small firm suffered losses equal to its fixed costs as a result of the predatory 
pricing, its total payoff equals 3γ-f, or 2γ+A. Assuming that the small firm will be able to 
compete into the future95, its future profits will equal δA/(1-δ). The sum of the current 
profits and future profits yields a total payoff of A/(1-δ)+2γ to the entrant.  
The dominant firm bears significant expenses if the entrant is successful in its 
federal claim. The court will assess damages against the dominant firm in the amount of 3γ 
plus the litigation costs of the small firm. The dominant firm still bears the cost of its first 
period losses equal to α, and it must also cover its own litigation expenses. The dominant 
firm will fail to eliminate the smaller rival if the lawsuit is successful for the small firm. 
                                                 
95 This assumption is predicated on the fact that injunctive relief is also available to successful plaintiffs. 
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A . The total payoff 








A small firm’s payoff varies in two important respects if the entrant elects to sue 
under the state SBC laws. First, the probability of bringing a successful lawsuit under the 
state laws is higher and will be denoted by a probability of φ, where φ≥µ. Second, the state 
SBC laws generally allow plaintiffs to recover actual damages.96 As a result, a successful 
plaintiff will recover its lost fixed costs and its expected profit. These lost profits combined 
with future accommodation profits yields a total payoff of A/(1-δ)+k*2γ to the successful 
small firm. If the state has a treble damage provision, the federal payoff and state payoffs 
are identical if the small firm succeeds. If the small firm is unsuccessful, it receives the 
same payoff that it does under the federal laws, -f-l.  
The dominant firm’s payoff will closely resemble its payoff under the federal laws 
if it loses the state suit, with the exception that the dominant firm will only incur actual 







The dominant firm’s payoff is identical to its payoff under the federal suit if the dominant 
firm successfully defends the suit.  
                                                 
96 Several states do have treble damage provisions. In this case, the payoff is exactly the same as the federal payoff. 
Assuming that plaintiffs have a higher probability of succeeding in a state suit, the state SBC law yields strictly higher 
payoffs than the federal laws.  
97 Unless the SBC law contains a treble damage provision. 
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If the dominant firm utilizes a strategy of predatory pricing and the small firm does 
not sue, the small firms profits will simply be the loss of its fixed costs associated with 
competing in the market. This yields a total payoff of -f to the small firm. The dominant 





M  if the firms choose this combination of strategies.  
4. Equilibrium of the Predation Game 
 I discuss the outcome of the predation in this section. The outcome of the game is 
dependent on several variables. One of the key determinants affecting the outcome of 
each game is the small firm’s probability of succeeding in its lawsuit. I will discuss the 
outcome of the game based on assumptions pertaining to whether the small firm’s 
expected payoff is greater by suing based on federal antitrust laws, state laws, or 
refraining from suing the dominant firm altogether. I use backwards induction to solve 
for the sub-game perfect equilibrium under the various assumptions. Figures 3-3 through 
3-5 illustrate the sub-game perfect equilibria of the game under various assumptions. 
 In this game, the small firm has three alternatives if the dominant firm engages in 
predatory pricing. It can sue under the federal antitrust laws, state sales below cost law, or 
not sue. I denote the expected payoff of suing under the federal law as EF, where EF is 

















A +(1-µ1)(-f-l). The expected payoff from suing under the state 

















kA +(1-µ1)(-f-l). The payoff from 






Conditions for Equilibrium Paths 
When the Small Firm Has a High Probability of Success  
Under the Federal or State Law 
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High Litigation Costs 
High Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
      X X      X X 
High Litigation Costs 
High Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 
X  X    X X  X    X X 
High Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 
  X  X X  X  X  X X  X 
High Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
X       X  X     X 
Low Litigation Costs 
High Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
X      X X  X    X X 
Low Litigation Costs 
High Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 
X  X     X  X     X 
Low Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
X X      X  X X    X 
Low Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 






Conditions for Equilibrium Paths 
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High Fixed Costs 
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High Litigation Costs 
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Low Fixed Costs 
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High Litigation Costs 
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Low Litigation Costs 
High Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
  X     X  X X     
Low Litigation Costs 
High Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 
  X     X  X X     
Low Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
  X X    X  X X     
Low Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 






Conditions for Equilibrium Paths 
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Under the Federal and State Law 
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High Litigation Costs 
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High Fixed Costs 
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High Litigation Costs 
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Low Fixed Costs 
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High Litigation Costs 
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Low Fixed Costs 
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High Litigation Costs 
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High Fixed Costs 
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High Fixed Costs 
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Low Fixed Costs 
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Low Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
High Fixed Costs 
X X X X      X X     
Low Litigation Costs 
Low Accommodation Profits 
Low Fixed Costs 






i. ENS>EF, ES 
  This case represents the scenario where the small firm’s optimal strategy is not 
suing if the dominant firm chooses a strategy of predatory pricing. This yields the small 
firm a payoff of  -f and the dominant firm a payoff of α+(δM/(1-δ)). The figures above 
illustrate that this scenario is most likely when the probability of succeeding in a lawsuit 
is low, litigation costs are high, fixed costs are low, and accommodation profits are low. 
Also, this solution is more likely when there is not an active state SBC law (as illustrated 
by Figure 3-2). 
 Using backward induction, the dominant firm will assess whether to use predatory 
pricing given that the small firm will not sue. The dominant firm will elect to 
accommodate the small firm’s entry only if the difference between predatory pricing 
profits and accommodation profits does not cover the losses that the dominant firm will 
incur in the initial below cost sales period. This can be shown by the following 
inequality: 
α+(δM/(1-δ))>A/(1-δ), (1) 
which equals,  
(δM/(1-δ))-A/(1-δ)>-α. (2) 
 Given that α is always negative, this inequality depicts the obvious result that 
predatory pricing must yield future profits that outweigh its predatory investment and the 
opportunity costs associated with accepting accommodation profits in the current and 
future periods. Some commentators suggest that predation is rarely a viable strategy. If they 




chosen regardless of the federal or state remedies. The dominant firm will not elect predate 
and the game ends with accommodation. If predatory pricing is the dominant firm’s 
optimal strategy, the entrant will not sue and incur losses of -f. Thus, if no lawsuit yields 
the small firm’s largest expected payoff, the small firm will receive profits of A/(1-δ) or -f, 
depending on whether predatory pricing is profitable for the dominant firm. Sales below 
cost laws do not prevent or deter such conduct in this case. 
 Empirically, the models in this dissertation do not distinguish between the case 
where predation is not profitable or the small firm does not sue. In the first case, the small 
firms will not deteriorate over time as a result of the predatory pricing. In the second case, 
small firms will diminish over time, but will do so evenly across states. Testing the effects 
of state laws does not capture this distinction because the laws would be irrelevant in 
determining the number of small firms.  
ii. EF > ES, ENS 
 If suing under federal antitrust laws yields the highest expected return for small 
firms that encounter predatory pricing, the sales below cost laws are not a factor that 
protects small firms. The small firm will sue the dominant firm under the federal antitrust 
laws if the dominant firm chooses a strategy of predatory pricing. The small firm’s 


















A +(1-µ1)(-f-l). This payoff must yield a higher expected payoff than no 
























































kA +(1-φ1)(-f-l).  (4) 











  (5) 
 In order for the federal lawsuit to yield a higher expected payoff than the state 




















1      (6)  
 Several factors determine whether this is the equilibrium in the predation game. 
First, a high probability of succeeding in the federal suit is the most important factor 
eliciting this outcome. Second, low litigation costs coupled with high fixed costs increase 
the likelihood of this outcome. Third, this outcome requires that the state law does not 
contain a treble damage provision. The magnitude of the accommodation profits do make 
the federal suit more desirable than no suit, but only make the federal suit preferable to the 
state suit if litigation costs are large and fixed costs are small.  
 These results are intuitive as well. A small firm will be more likely to sue if the 
probability of winning a lawsuit is greater. Litigation costs serve as a deterrent to lawsuits. 
If the firm must pay larger litigation costs in the event that it unsuccessfully sues the 
dominant firm, its expected payoff will decline. Fixed costs are a sunk investment by the 




will triple these costs in the form of recoverable damages if the small firm succeeds in a 
federal lawsuit, which significantly increases damages and the small firm's expected payoff 
from suing under the federal laws. The state law has a higher probability of success, which 
implies that it will have a higher expected payoff if it also includes identical damages to the 
federal law. This illustrates that the federal lawsuit should never be equilibrium if the state 
law provides treble damages.  
 Given that the small firm will sue under the antitrust laws, the dominant firm must 
choose to accommodate entry with a payoff of A/(1-δ) or pursue a predatory strategy 
regardless of the lawsuit. This yields a strictly inferior payoff to the dominant firm for 
predatory pricing than the scenario where the small firm did not sue. The dominant firm 
will elect to choose a predatory pricing strategy only if the expected benefit from 
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lA        (8) 
 This result suggest that two primary variables, the dominant firm's probability of 
succeeding in the lawsuit and the magnitude of future monopoly profits, increase the 
chances a dominant firm chooses a predatory pricing strategy. All of the other variables, 
including current and future accommodation profits, fixed costs, litigation costs, and the 




predatory pricing. The effect of litigation costs depends on its relationship to the other 
variables. 
 If the payoff structure and probability of success are such that the dominant firm 
will accommodate, the small firm will receive accommodation profits and the game ends. If 
either the probability of a predator successfully defending its lawsuit or its potential 
monopoly profits are exceptionally high compared to the other relevant variables, then the 
predator can elect to use predatory pricing despite the potential for a lawsuit. In this case, 
the small firm will choose to sue the dominant firm. 
 The preceding results also possibly explain the reason that “predatory pricing is 
rarely tried.” Federal predatory pricing lawsuits are most likely to arise when 
accommodation profits or fixed costs are considerable when compared to litigation costs. 
The paradox facing small firms is that dominant firms are more likely to engage in 
predatory pricing when accommodation profits are relatively low compared to monopoly 
profits. This result is fairly intuitive in that dominant firms have little incentive to utilize a 
predatory strategy when accommodation profits are significant. Dominant firms will be 
unwilling to incur losses to eliminate rivals when the margin between monopoly and 
accommodation profits converges to zero. This creates a sorting issue suggesting that 
antitrust litigation is not likely an optimal outcome when predatory pricing is an optimal 
strategy.  
 iii. ES>EF  >ENS 
 This equilibrium path depicts the scenario where the small firm is better off suing 




law to the federal law. If a state does not have a SBC law, the equilibrium is identical to the 
previous section where the small firm will sue under the federal law. 
  If the payoff structure is such that the dominant firm will accommodate, the small 
firm will enter the market and both firms each receive accommodation profits. However, 
the small firm must choose between a state suit, a federal suit, or no suit at all if the 
predatory pricing strategy maximizes the dominant firm’s profits. If ES>EF  >ENS, then 
condition (5) above will be met, but condition (6) will not hold and the small firm will sue 
under the state law. If no state law is available, the firm will choose to sue under the federal 
laws. For this condition to exist, several factors must be present. The probability of winning 
the state suit must be significantly greater than the federal counterpart. Litigation costs 
must be low enough to encourage a suit, but not so low as to encourage a federal suit, and 
fixed costs must be high enough to encourage a suit, but not so high as to encourage a 
federal suit. Accommodation profits must also be significant. This condition will also be 
met if a state has treble damages and the federal suit is preferable to no suit.  
 The dominant firm will choose a predatory strategy only if its expected payoff from 
predation is higher than its accommodation profits, given that it will be sued under the SBC 
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The only distinctions between the incentives that the state and federal law create are 
the differences in damages and the probability of success.  




















−+++ .  (10) 
This condition is similar to equation (8) for predation under the federal regime. An 
increase in future monopoly profits and a decrease in the small firm's probability of success 
are again the primary factors that increase the likeliness that the dominant firm chooses a 
predatory pricing strategy. However, increases in future accommodation profits, litigation 
costs, the small firm’s fixed costs, and the cost of predation in the initial period remain the 
variables that also deter predatory pricing. The primary distinction between the state and 
federal incentive mechanisms is the effect of the damages. Treble damages increase the 
small firm's probability of success required for the dominant firm to choose predation. 
Thus, absent treble damages under the SBC law, the state laws must yield a higher 
probability of success to have any effect in deterring predatory pricing beyond the 
protection that the federal laws afford.  
 The combination of predatory pricing and state suits may also be a rare 
combination. Low accommodation profits increase the likelihood that a dominant firm will 
choose predatory pricing; however, low accommodation profits also lower the small firm's 
potential damages and reduces the incentive to sue under the state law. By contrast, when 
accommodation profits are large, the dominant firm will be less inclined to choose a 
predatory strategy and the small firm will be more inclined to sue. The requisite foundation 
for predatory pricing accompanied by a state legal response occurs when accommodation 




 If the state remedy is superior the federal remedy and the federal remedy is 
preferred to no suit, the state laws may have an effect on small businesses. The federal law 
already provides protection for small firms, but the state law is preferred. Not all states 
have a SBC law. In the game where the small firm can choose the state remedy it will, but 
small firms will elect to sue under the federal laws in other states. Whether the state law 
protects small firms depends on the marginal effectiveness of the law. If the federal law 
does not deter predatory pricing, the state law may have the effect of deterring it. The state 
law may also effectively counter predatory pricing if it occurs by providing more court 
intervention.  
 iv. ES> ENS >EF 
 This condition occurs when the state law is yields the highest potential payoff for 
the small firm and the federal law yields no protection. If a state does not have a SBC law, 
the equilibrium will be for the small firm to refrain from suing and lose its fixed costs. If 
ES>EF  >ENS, then neither condition (5) nor (6) will be met and the small firm will sue under 
the state law. In addition, the state law must also be more desirable no suit. This requires 
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The small firm will not sue if the state remedy is unavailable. The probability of winning 
the federal suit must be significantly low and the probability of winning the state suit must 
be high for this condition to exist. Litigation costs must be high with low accommodation 
profits. This condition arises out of the fact that damages are not substantial, but the 




 State laws are most likely to have an effect if this condition is met. However, in 
order for state laws to protect small firms under this condition, predatory pricing must be a 
viable strategy by the dominant firm. For example, predatory pricing is not likely to be a 
dominant firm's strategy when it sells durable goods because the dominant firm cannot 
promptly sell the product in the future at higher prices. In this case, the state law is 
irrelevant even though it would be used.  
v. Summary of the Predation Game  
 There are four equilibrium paths of play. First, the dominant firm may find 
predatory pricing infeasible and accommodate. This can occur because the margin between 
monopoly profits and accommodation profits is sufficiently small that the benefits from 
predatory pricing and a future monopoly do not justify the expense that the dominant firm 
will incur in the initial period. The threat of a lawsuit may also deter the dominant firm 
from engaging in predatory pricing. The margin between monopoly and accommodation 
profits must be significant for this condition to exist.  
 The second alternative is that the dominant firm chooses a predatory pricing 
strategy and the small firm does not sue. This result occurs when the small firm has no 
incentive to sue and the dominant firm's receives a larger payoff from predatory pricing 
than accommodation. This equilibrium is most likely to occur when litigation costs are 
high, accommodation profits are low, and fixed costs are low. If a state does not have a 
SBC law this equilibrium path is also more likely. 
 Third, the dominant firm may choose a predatory pricing strategy when the small 
firm will sue under the federal antitrust laws. This result requires that potential monopoly 




predation despite its litigation costs and the potential consequences of losing a lawsuit. The 
small firm will choose to sue when its lost accommodation profits are sufficiently large, 
and its litigation costs are minimized relative to accommodation profits. Fixed costs also 
increase the small firm’s likelihood of initiating a federal lawsuit.  
 The fourth equilibrium involves suing under the state SBC laws once the dominant 
firm elects a predatory pricing strategy. This is not a remedy available in all states. In the 
game without a SBC alternative, the small firm must again choose only between no suit 
and accommodation. The key variables that encourage predation by a dominant firm or 
lawsuit by a small firm under the state laws are the same variables that affect the decision 
making process under the federal laws. The motivating factor for predation by a dominant 
firm is the margin between monopoly and accommodation profits. The dominant firm must 
also factor in the effect of the potential damages and litigation costs associated with a state 
SBC lawsuit, combined with its probability of successfully defending such a suit. 
Conversely, the small firm will require significant accommodation profits sue the dominant 
firm. Litigation and fixed costs are the small firm’s primary deterrent to entering and suing 
the dominant firm. 
 For purposes of this dissertation, if either no suit or the federal suit is equilibrium, 
the state laws are insignificant with respect to deterring predatory pricing. These equilibria 
have one of three meanings. First, the state law may not provide enough protection to 
induce the small firm to sue. Second, the state law may not provide additional incentive to 




viable dominant firm strategy. In any case, the effect of the SBC law is negligible and the 
state law should not test as significant to protecting small firms.  
 The most important equilibrium in this analysis is when the dominant firm will 
choose predatory pricing and the small firm will sue under the state laws. In this 
equilibrium, two important results can occur. First, the federal laws could still afford more 
protection to small firms than no suit. Small firms will sue under the SBC laws if the state 
permits, and sue under the federal law otherwise. The empirical tests may show that the 
state laws protect small businesses in this instance. The federal laws already provide some 
protection against predation, so the marginal effectiveness will determine whether the state 
laws are of any real importance. This result should be more profound when a state provides 
treble damages or a change in the expected returns to federal litigation occurs. For instance, 
treble damages increase the marginal effectiveness of the law by increasing the expected 
payout. This condition is likely when the SBC laws without treble damages have a minimal 
impact, but the laws with treble damages have a greater impact on small firm viability. 
Also, when the state law does not provide much more protection than the federal suit 
initially, the impact of the state law should increase as federal protection became less 
effective. This condition can be evaluated empirically. If the SBC laws provide minimal 
protection and the impact of the SBC law increases following the Matsushita decision, it is 
likely that the state laws were preferable to the federal law when the federal law was 
superior to no suit. 
 Secondly, the federal laws could provide no protection when the state law is the 




of small firms. A small firm would elect to refrain from suing if the state law is not 
available. This suggests that all of the small firm protection is attributable to the SBC law. 
In this instance, the impact of the SBC law on small firms should be significant while treble 
damages or a change in the federal regime should not increase the small firms beyond the 
simple SBC law. This result is likely because the SBC law is able to deter predatory pricing 
without treble damages or a shift in the application of the federal law.  
 It is still possible that the SBC law is not relevant even if the small firm would use 
it. The dominant firm may not have the incentive to choose predatory pricing. For instance, 
if the dominant firm sells durable goods, it will not have the incentive to utilize predatory 
pricing. Predatory pricing by a seller of durable goods presents an issue pertaining to the 
ability of a dominant firm to predate. A durable goods seller is unlikely to find predatory 
pricing profitable. A firm selling a durable good below cost will increase sales of the 
product and those sales may in fact eliminate a smaller firm. Following the initial period, 
the dominant firm will be unable to recoup its lost profits because there will be little 
demand left for the product once it increases its price. There are two primary reasons why 
the dominant may never recover its losses from pricing the durable good below cost. First, 
the dominant firm creates more current sales when it lowers the price of the durable good 
below cost and lowers its demand tomorrow since consumers do not typically purchase 
these goods in consecutive periods.98 Second, consumers form expectations that the durable 
good monopolist will lower price in the future, because it can make additional profits by 
                                                 




pricing off of the residual demand curve to maximize profits.99 Consumers may wait to 
purchase the good until the price has declined. This would be the initial period in the case 
of predatory pricing. This result demonstrates that SBC laws should have an empirical 
impact in durable goods markets. The furniture stores, building materials, and automotive 
markets are all examples of market where the SBC law should have no impact.   
 The problem facing small firms is that accommodation profits are positively related 
to lawsuits under either the federal or state law. Equations (10) and (11) illustrate that 
accommodation profits lower the dominant firms desire to predate and increase the small 
firm's incentive to sue under the state law. Thus, small firms have the greatest incentive to 
sue when dominant firms have the greatest incentive to accommodate, regardless of legal 
remedies. This paradox explains why predatory pricing cases are “rarely tried”. The state 
law becomes more desirable relative to federal antitrust protection as accommodation 
profits increase.100 This result again demonstrates the pitfall of the state SBC laws. The 
laws become more desirable as the likeliness that a dominant firm preys declines.  
5. Player Strategies in the Loss Leader Game  
 These games are nearly identical to their predation game counterparts. The only 
distinction between strategies in this game and the predation game is that the dominant firm 
elects to sell goods as loss leaders or accommodate. The loss leader strategy effectively 
replaces the predatory pricing strategy discussed in the preceding sections. I present two 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 
100 Willard F. Mueller and Thomas W. Patterson, Effectiveness of State Below-Cost-Sales Laws: Evidence From the 
Grocery Trade, Journal of Retailing, Volume 62 No. 2 (Summer, 1986), 166-184. The authors note that SBC laws tend 
to protect medium and larger stores more than smaller stores. These firms likely have larger accommodation profits than 





variations of the game. Figure 3-6 illustrates the loss leader game when the small firm has 
the alternative to sue under the state SBC laws, and Figure 3-7 is a version of the game 
when the federal laws are the small firms' only available remedy. I solve for sub-game 
































No Suit Federal State 
β/(1-δ) 
ε/(1-δ) 








































6. Payoffs in the Loss Leader Game 
The payoffs in the loss leader game vary significantly than the predation game for 
both the dominant and small firms. The only payoff that remains constant between the two 
games is the payoff for a strategy of accommodation by the dominant firm. In this instance, 
the payoffs are identical to the predation game counterpart. If the dominant firm 
accommodates the entry each firm’s profits will equal A/(1-δ). 
The solutions begin to take a different form if the dominant firm utilizes a loss 
leader strategy. If the small firm forbears from suing it does not necessarily lose all of its 
























leader selling versus predatory pricing. Predatory pricing is specifically intended to 
eliminate rivals. A predatory strategy is not feasible if the dominant firm cannot eliminate 
or discipline its rivals.101 Thus, predators are unlikely to attempt predation against rivals of 
significant size and financial clout. Loss leader strategies by contrast do not require that a 
firm harm its rival in order to be successful. Loss leaders are a current period profit 
maximizing strategy. As a result, loss leaders can be sustained indefinitely if there are no 
laws preventing such a practice.102 Although loss leaders do not have to harm rivals to 
succeed, loss leaders do have the potential to harm rivals and alter future payoffs.  In 
certain instances, the loss leader will have the effect of eliminating rivals, which creates a 
future payoff for the dominant firm that mimics the predatory pricing result.103  
A small firm’s payoff depends on the effect of the loss leader on its business. If the 
small firm forbears from suing the dominant firm the small firm will earn a payoff of ε/(1-
δ). The value of ε can range between -f and A/(1-δ). A value of -f is applicable if the loss 
leader effectively forecloses the small firms business in the same manner as predatory 
pricing. ε will equal A/(1-δ) if the loss leader does not negatively affect the small firm’s 
business.  
The dominant firm’s payoff is β/(1-δ) if the small firm does not sue under state or 
federal law. This payoff takes the range of A/(1-δ) to β+δM/(1-δ). The dominant firm’s 
payoff will resemble accommodation profits more closely only if the loss leader is 
                                                 
101 Authors and courts have also noted the possibility that a predator may use such a strategy to discipline rivals.  
102 Rajiv Lal, Price Promotions: Limiting Competitive Encroachment, Marketing Science, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Summer, 1990), 
247-262. Lal observes that price promotions may be long-run profit maximizing strategies in addition to short-run 




ineffective in increasing its profits. The higher end of the range entails a first period profit 
from loss leader selling plus future monopoly profits if the small firm is eliminated from 
the market.  
 The small firm may elect to sue under the federal antitrust laws for attempted 
monopolization, albeit with a minimal probability of success as denoted by 1-µ2. The 
reason that the federal laws have almost no chance for success is that the federal laws do 
not prohibit loss leaders. In order for the small firm to prevail, the court must err in 
applying the facts to the law and condemn the loss leader as a predatory pricing attempt. If 
the small firm does prevail its payoff will be A/(1-δ)+2λ.  
 This payoff is the result of granting the small firm treble damages. The damage, λ, 
is equal to the difference between accommodation profits and its profits that result from the 
competitor’s loss leader selling practice. Thus, λ=A-ε. If the small firm succeeds in its 
lawsuit, it receives its 3λ in addition to the payoff of ε that it received from participating in 
the market. This equals 3(A-ε) + ε, or A + 2λ. The court can also award injunctive relief 
that will forbid the dominant firm from pricing below cost. This will yield future 
accommodation profits in remaining periods of δA/(1-δ). The sum of the court award, the 
profits earned in the current period, and future profits equals a total payoff of A/(1-δ)+ 2λ.  
 The dominant firms payoff is a function of several factors if the small firm 
successfully sues the dominant firm in a predatory pricing suit. The dominant firm will 
receive β in the current period by selling goods as loss leaders. Additionally, the dominant 
firm’s future profits will equal δA/(1-δ) under the assumption that the court will prohibit 
                                                                                                                                                 
103 Willard F. Mueller and Thomas W. Patterson, Effectiveness of State Below-Cost-Sales Laws: Evidence From the 




future below cost sales. The dominant firm will be liable for treble damages and the small 
firms litigation costs in addition. This yields a total payoff of β+(A/(1-δ))-3λ-2l if the 
dominant firm loses a federal antitrust case as a result of its loss leader strategy. 
 If the lawsuit fails, the small firms payoff will be its profits from competition given 
that the dominant firm sells goods as loss leaders minus litigation costs. This results in a 
total payoff to the small firm of ε-l. The dominant will earn profits associated with loss 
leader selling in the current period and will maintain that profitability in future periods. The 
dominant firm will be responsible for the litigation costs it incurs as a result of the lawsuit. 
This yields a total payoff of (β/(1-δ))-l to for the dominant firm.  
 The state law is the more viable alternative that small firms may utilize to prosecute 
for loss leader selling. Small firms have the potential to sue the dominant firm with a 
probability of success equal to φ2. Assuming that the state law does not permit treble 
damages, a small firm that successfully sues under the state SBC law is entitled to actual 
damages plus its litigation expenses. This remedy effectively places the small firm in the 
position that it would be in if the loss leader selling practice did not occur, which results in 
a payoff of A/(1-δ). If the statute does permit treble damages, the small firm receives a 
payoff of A/(1-δ)+2λ if it succeeds. 
 The entrant’s success will cause the dominant firm to incur costs associated with 
defending the lawsuit, compensating the defendant for its lost sales, and the actual damages 
of λ. The dominant firm will also be required to sell above cost in remaining future periods. 
Deducting the costs associated with losing the SBC lawsuit from the dominant firm’s 
                                                                                                                                                 




current period loss leader profits plus future accommodation profits gives the dominant 
firm’s total payoff of  
β+(A/(1-δ))-λ-k*2λ-2l.  
 The small firm will receive the same payoffs under the state and federal legal 
regimes if small firm unsuccessfully sues the dominant firm. The payoff is simply its 
profits from competition minus litigation costs, or ε-l. The dominant firm’s payoff is also 
identical to the outcome under the federal laws when it is successful. Its payoff is simply 
β/(1-δ)-l. Figure 3-6 illustrates the strategies and payoffs of the loss leader game when a 
state remedy is available. 
7. Payoffs in the Loss Leader Game 
 
i. ENS >EF, ES 
 The small firm may find it optimal not to sue if the dominant firm utilizes a loss 
leader strategy. This implies that the small firm likely perceives the value of the damages it 
suffers arising from lost sales do not merit the expenditure of litigation costs. The dominant 
firm must choose its strategy to sell goods as loss leaders or accommodate the small firm. 
The dominant firm knows that it will not be sued if it chooses a loss leader strategy. This 
implies that the dominant firm will sell goods as loss leaders when: 
β/(1-δ) > A/(1-δ),         (12) 
where β/(1-δ) is the dominant firm’s payoff for selling certain goods at a loss.  
 The value that β/(1-δ) assumes varies depending on the circumstances. The 
maximum value that it can assume is β + δM/(1-δ). This value represents a scenario where 




exceeds the value from accommodation. The value δM/(1-δ) implies that the dominant 
firm’s loss leader will eliminate the small firm in the future periods, allowing the dominant 
firm to reap future monopoly profits.  
 The dominant firm’s minimum profit from selling loss leaders is α + δA/(1-δ). This 
suggests that the dominant firm only incurs losses as a result of selling loss leaders in the 
first period, which is similar to predation. The dominant firm will accommodate in future 
periods because selling unprofitable loss leaders only results in lost profits when the small 
firm remains in the market.  
 A dominant firm has the incentive to sell loss leaders, irrespective of future profits, 
when VA1QA1+ VB1Q B1 > VA2Q A2+ VB2QB2,  (13) 
where:       
 V= The markup of price over cost. 
 Q= The quantity sold by the dominant firm. 
 A and B represents goods A and B. The numbers 1 and 2 represents whether good 
A is being sold below cost or above cost respectively. This equation can be re-arranged to 
show that the selling good A as a loss leader will be profitable if:  
VB1QB1-VB2QB2 > VA2QA2 - VA1QA1.      (14) 
 I assume that the loss leader will generate higher sales rather than a higher markup 
for good B. This allows me to set VB1=VB2. Now, the equation can be re-written as: 
VB(QB1-QB2) > VA2QA2 - VA1QA1      (15) 
 Since the quantity of the firm will equal its market share times the market quantity 




sB is the dominant firm’s market share of good B. Thus, the dominant firm will sell good A 





QVQVs 1122 −≥ .        (16) 
 This result depicts several implications regarding the profitability of loss leaders. 
The expense of selling a good below cost is the discount below cost times the quantity of 
the good the firm sells. There is also an opportunity cost associated with selling the good 
below cost. The magnitude of this opportunity cost plus the actual loss deters a firm from 
selling below cost.   
 Three factors will encourage the dominant firm to choose a loss leader strategy. The 
size of markup for the good sold above cost will increase the likelihood that the dominant 
firm sells good A as a loss leader. If the dominant firm can command large profits for good 
B, it will likely take initiatives to increase the sales of good B. The likeliness of loss leader 
selling also increases when the size of the market for good B is large. The size of market B 
will induce a dominant firm to attempt to gain more of that market. The dominant firm’s 
change in market share of good B is a significant factor that will encourage a dominant firm 
to sell good A as a loss leader. This market share can be gained as a result of generating 
higher store traffic, a high negative cross-elasticity of demand between goods A and B, or a 
number of other factors. 104 Thus, the significance of a loss leader is not in its ability to 
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eliminate rivals, but its ability to increase the sale of other goods. An attempt to sell goods 
below cost when the effect of those sales is not congruent with condition (16) is dependent 
on recouping current losses and a predatory strategy rather than a loss leader. 
 Whether the retailers sell a single or multiple products is another factor that 
influences a firm’s decision to implement a loss leader strategy.105 When both firms are 
sellers of a single product, there can be no claim that the pricing conduct is a loss leader 
strategy because a firm selling a single product below cost will lose profits on the endeavor.  
This is only rational if the entrant is eliminated from the market and the incumbent' s 
discounted future monopoly profits are greater than the losses it incurred from the below 
cost sales combined with the profits it lost by failing to accommodate the entry. 
 The case of both the entrant and incumbent selling multiple products is similar to 
the single good case.  If two firms sell identical products, there can be no rational loss 
leader strategy unless the resulting loss on one product creates sufficient demand on the 
other goods that outweighs the loss on the good sold below cost. However, such a strategy 
should not result in the elimination of small firms from the market. Assuming the customer 
bases and cross-elasticities are the same, it would be rational for the small firm to mimic 
the loss leading behavior of the dominant firm if the loss leader strategy is rational. Both 
firms would likely find it undesirable to sell loss leaders when other firms mimic the 
strategy. This behavior simply creates losses for the sale of one good with no resulting 
increase in market share for the other good.  
                                                 





There is one caveat to the analysis above. The analysis assumes that the firms and 
consumers have perfect information regarding price. Lack of price information is one 
rationale for loss leader selling.106 A firm can exploit search costs and induce consumers to 
purchase all of its needs at one store if prices are not common knowledge. This allows 
stores to initiate loss leader policies with asymmetric price information to attract high value 
customers, even when its competitors sell identical products.107 All firms may find loss 
leader pricing a necessity when consumers have limited information. If only one firm 
initiates the loss leader price, it will gain an advantage over other firms by reducing 
consumer search costs and increasing customer traffic.108 The store will attract the high 
value customers as a result.109 Other firms must also follow the behavior or risk losing the 
high value customers to competitors. Thus, all firms in an industry may utilize loss leaders 
when consumers lack of information pertaining to price.   
 It is plausible that a dominant firm will sell multiple products in a market where 
small firms are single product sellers. Although not a precise example, some firms utilize a 
combination store format wherein the store sells groceries and general merchandise. These 
firms often sell gasoline that competes with gasoline convenient stores. This scenario poses 
a different problem than either of the preceding market structures. A weak or strong 
incumbent may choose a rational loss leader strategy that also has the effect of eliminating 
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a rival.  If the incumbent prices the entrant’s good below cost, it can theoretically acquire 
the market for that good while maximizing current period profits. This strategy requires 
that the cross-elasticity of demand is sufficiently negative and large for the two products. 
Complementary goods may rationally be sold as loss leaders even if the firm is a multi-
product monopolist.110 This market structure allows the dominant firm to eliminate rivals 
without incurring initial losses. The dominant firm can essentially use a rational loss leader 
strategy that will have the same effect as predatory pricing in the long run. 
 The dominant firm will accommodate the small firm’s entry when accommodation 
profits are greater than its profits from loss leader selling. This implies that property (12) is 
not satisfied. The small firm then faces a decision to enter with profits of A/(1-δ) or to 
refrain from entering with profits of zero. The small firm will rationally enter the market.  
 The dominant firm will elect a loss leader strategy when property (12) is satisfied. 
The small firm must not choose between staying out of the market with zero profit and 
entering the market with a payoff equal to ε/(1-δ). This value can range between A/(1-δ) 
and -f. If the loss leader is relatively ineffective, the dominant firm’s below cost sales 
should have little effect on the small firm. This implies that the small firm’s payoff should 
not deviate much from A/(1-δ). This scenario is most likely when both firms carry similar 
product lines as described above. If the dominant firm’s loss leader has the effect of 
eliminating the small firm, as in the case where the dominant firm carries a more extensive 
product line, the small firm will be eliminated from the market and receive a payoff of -f. 
The small firm will enter the market only if ε/(1-δ)>0, otherwise it will stay out. Neither the 





state nor federal law will encourage entry by small firms when a dominant firm’s loss 
leader causes the small firm to suffer negative profits and the small firm’s optimal strategy 
is to refrain from suing. 
ii. EF >ES, ENS 
 This strategy reflects the scenario where the small firm’s response to a loss leader 
strategy is to sue under the federal antitrust laws. This result is generally not feasible, as the 
federal antitrust laws are not intended to prevent loss leader selling.111 This condition is 
only plausible if the damages from loss leader selling are so large that the small firm is 
willing to risk the probability that the court errs in its favor.  
 The dominant firm will choose between selling a loss leader and accommodating 
the small firm’s entry. The dominant firm will choose a loss leader strategy if: 
(1-µ2)(β/(1-δ)-l) + µ2(β + (δA/(1-δ))-3λ-2l) > A/(1-δ)   (17) 
 The dominant firm can reasonably assume it will succeed in the lawsuit because it 
has no expectation that the loss leader is illegal under the federal law, and the court should 
not grant relief to the small firm. This result is similar to the scenario where no suit is the 
small firm’s optimal strategy. The only distinction is that the dominant firm must account 
for the possibility of litigation costs when balancing the benefits of loss leader pricing with 
accommodation. Whether dominant firm implements a loss leader strategy is again 
dependent on the factors making loss leading profitable. The dominant firm will 
accommodate if loss leader pricing minus litigation costs yield a return less than 
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accommodation. The dominant firm will continue with the loss leader strategy if it yields 
superior profits to accommodation.  
 The small firm will be face a decision to refrain from entering the market or sue 
under the antitrust laws if the dominant firm does not accommodate. It will sue under the 
antitrust laws if: 
(1-φ2)((ε/(1-δ)) - l) + φ2((A/(1-δ)) + 2λ) > ε/(1-δ)    (18) 
 The problem for the small firm is that its probability of success, µ1, is 
approximately zero. Thus, the small firm’s payoff from loss leader selling is generally 
lower by the amount of the litigation costs. Its only chance for a positive payoff is if the 
probability that the court errs is significant. This results in the same conclusion reached 
when the small firm’s greatest payoff was abstaining from suing. The small firm will enter 
the market if ε/(1-δ) > 0. Stated differently, the small firm must be able to remain viable in 
lieu of the dominant firm’s predatory pricing. This result illustrates that the federal law 
essentially provides protection to small firms against loss leader pricing only to the extent 
that the court errs. 
iii. ES >EF, ENS 
 Unlike their federal counterparts, state SBC laws punish dominant firms for loss 
leader pricing. The state SBC law is the small firms best alternative when: 
(1-φ2)((ε/(1-δ))-l) + φ2((A/(1-δ)+k*2λ) > ε/(1-δ)     (19) 
 This suggests that a small firm will sue when the discrepancy between 
accommodation profits and it profits when the dominant firm sells loss leaders merits the 




The dominant firm is forced to consider the affect of its lawsuit on its profits before 
electing a loss leader strategy. The dominant firm will elect a loss leader strategy when: 
(1-φ2)((β/(1-δ)-l) + φ2((β + (A/(1-δ)) - λ - 2l) > A/1-δ.   (20) 















l .       (21) 
 This result illustrates that the size of accommodation profits, litigation costs, and 
the small firm’s profits when it utilizes loss leaders negatively influences its decision to sell 
loss leaders. The small firm’s current profits have an inverse relationship with the dominant 
firm’s expected payoff. As the small firm’s expected payoff increases, ε/(1-δ), the small 
firm’s damages increase, λ, creating a disincentive to loss leader selling. The dominant 
firms current and future profits that accrue from loss leader selling positively influence the 
firm’s decision to sell goods as loss leaders.  
 The dominant firm’s profits from loss leader selling in the current and future 
periods provide greater incentive to utilize loss leaders. Critics of predatory pricing often 
argue that it is not feasible because the potential for future monopoly profits do not justify 
the first period predatory investment, especially if there are limited barriers to entry in the 
market. Loss leader sales do not entail the same problem. Loss leaders are profitable and 
profit maximizing in the first period. A dominant firm can technically utilize this strategy 
indefinitely. Of course, the value of this strategy increases to the dominant firm as it has the 
ancillary effect of eliminating small firms from the market. However, as the strategy 




suggests that loss leaders will occur and be accompanied by a lawsuit in situations where 
the dominant firm is a multi-product seller and the small firm carries a less diverse line of 
products. 
 If the dominant firm pursues a loss leader strategy, the small firm will elect between 
entering and suing under the state SBC laws or staying out of the market. The small firm 
will enter if: 
φ2((ε/(1-δ))-l) + (1-φ2)((A/(1-δ)) > 0     (22) 
or 
  A/(1-δ) > φ2((A/(1-δ)) +l - ε/(1-δ)).   (23) 
Multiplying both sides by 1-δ yields: 
A>φ2 (A - ε + l(1-δ))       (24) 
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 Equation (25) demonstrates that accommodation profits increase the likeliness of a 
lawsuit. If the loss leader does not significantly harm the small firm, or if litigation costs 
are large the small firm will likely refrain from entering the market.  
 The loss leader problem still presents the same paradox that predatory pricing did in 
regards to incentives. Large lost accommodation profits still serve as one of the primary 
factors that induce small firms to sue. However, as these accommodation profits grow, they 
serve as a deterrent to loss leader selling. Equation (16) also illustrates this result. It should 




leaders. Since the federal law does not deter the practice, states with SBC laws should have 
a higher presence of small firms. 
iv. Summary of the Loss Leader Game  
 This game depicts the scenarios when the dominant firm will pursue a loss leader 
strategy and when the small firm will respond with a lawsuit. State SBC laws are the only 
viable alternative to protecting small firms if loss leaders threaten the viability of the small 
firm. The probability of success under the antitrust laws is near zero because the law is not 
a restraint on loss leaders. It is clear that the state law is the only remedy available if a firm 
chooses a loss leader strategy. Since the state law does not serve as a surrogate to the 
federal law in this instance, the relevant inquiry is whether loss leader strategies tend to 
eliminate rivals, and whether the small firms will respond with lawsuits as a result. 
 The dominant firm will sell goods as loss leaders in situations where the dominant 
firm sells a more diverse line of products than its smaller rival. Additionally, the losses that 
the dominant firm incurs on the good sold below cost must generate cross sales in its other 
products. Its goal with the loss leader is to attract consumers to the more valuable product 
line and gain a larger market share of that line.  
 Loss leaders can be profit maximizing in the initial period and be an optimal 
strategy regardless of the effect it has on small firms. However, the dominant firm’s profits 
increase if the loss leader has the ancillary effect of eliminating its rival. This is the 
scenario that will most likely lead to litigation. The dominant firm has the greatest 
incentive to sell loss leaders and the small firms losses are at a maximum because it is 
eliminated from the market. This effect is balanced by the possible accommodation profits. 




strategies. Firms will require smaller opportunity costs to choose a loss leader strategy. 
Small firms find this property unappealing if they desire to initiate a lawsuit. This again 
poses the same paradox as predatory pricing. Small firms become more willing to sue, as 
dominant firms are less willing to sell goods as loss leaders.  
C. Testable Hypotheses for Empirical Study 
In the next chapter this paper provides an empirical study on whether sales below 
cost laws protect small businesses. I developed a set of testable hypotheses from the work 
in this section to focus the scope of the empirical study. The purpose of these hypotheses is 
to analyze if and how state sales below cost laws will extend beyond the federal predatory 
pricing laws to protect small businesses. The testable hypotheses are as follows: 
1. The analysis pertaining to predatory pricing revealed that the most common 
factors eliciting predatory pricing by dominant firms can also deter lawsuits and vice versa. 
If this scenario occurs, neither the available federal or state remedies should deter predatory 
pricing or provide incentive for lawsuits that would protect small firms. SBC laws should 
not deter predatory pricing or protect small firms from predation in this instance, and the 
SBC laws should test insignificant.  
2. If the state law is superior to the federal law and the federal law deters predation, 
the SBC variable will test significant depending on the marginal effectiveness of the law 
above and beyond the federal protection. More importantly, the impact of the state law 
should increase as the federal protection diminishes. I test this hypothesis by examining the 
effect of the state laws when the potential for recovery under the federal laws diminished. If 




the Matsushita decision. Additionally, factors that increase the probability of success under 
the state law, such as minimum markup requirements, should increase the viability of the 
law.  
3. If the state law is superior to an irrelevant federal law, the state law will most 
likely show an increased presence of small firms. Since the state law alone discourages 
predatory pricing, the effect of treble damages and deterioration of the federal law should 
be minimal. I test this hypothesis by examining the effect of state laws, treble damage 
provisions, and by evaluating the effect of the laws on the percentage of small business as 
federal protection against predatory pricing withered throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. If this case holds, the SBC law should be significant, with less significant treble 
damage provisions and changes in the environment of predatory pricing.   
4. Firms should not select a predatory pricing strategy for durable goods. The 
ability to recoup losses is limited with these goods. State laws should not protect sellers of 
durable goods against predatory pricing, because predatory pricing should not occur. This 
hypothesis is tested in the hardware/building materials market, the tire/automotive market, 
and the furniture market.112   
5. This chapter suggests that state SBC laws are strictly superior to federal antitrust 
laws with respect to protecting small firms against loss leaders. The SBC laws should show 
a positive and significant correlation between state SBC laws and the percentage of small 
firms in a state. Minimum markup provisions should increase the likelihood that the SBC 
law protects small firms from loss leader pricing. These provisions provide a statutory 
                                                 
112 These markets are all defined as durable goods retailers by the Census Bureau. Monthly Retail Trade Survey, 1991 




measure of cost and allow a small firm to sue with a reasonable degree of certainty. States 
without such a provision still enforce fixed cost provisions, but the certainty associated 
with a lawsuit is absent.  
6. This chapter suggests that firms most likely to utilize loss leader selling practices 
are firms that sell multiple product lines. It also suggests that the loss leader products 
should bear a high negative cross-elasticity with other products in the store. Loss leader 
pricing should be most common in the following markets: Grocery stores, variety/general 
merchandise stores, and hardware stores.113 The effect of SBC laws should be most 
prevalent in these markets. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF SALES BELOW COST LAWS 
A. Introduction 
This chapter tests whether state sales below cost laws protect small businesses. 
Small businesses should be more prevalent in states with sales below cost laws if these 
laws are effective. Houston and Anderson and Johnson find that general SBC laws have 
done little to prevent the decline of small businesses, but they use different techniques for 
estimating the number of small businesses. They utilize a different functional form for 
estimating the impact of SBC laws and they do not account for the intricacies 
distinguishing SBC laws. In addition, both analyses examined a cross-sectional data set 
rather than a panel model. The Anderson and Johnson article is a specific inquiry into the 
effect of sales below cost laws on retail gasoline, whereas Houston examines total retail 
sales as well as a number of specific industries.114  
A study by Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm utilizes a functional form similar to the one 
I present in this chapter. They examine the effect of SBC laws on price and the number of 
small firms in the retail gasoline market using a panel data set adjusted for 
homoskedasticity and serial correlation. Their article does not examine the general SBC 
laws across several industries, nor does it account for the intricacies in the laws such as 
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treble damages.115 Nevertheless, their article provides a similar structural framework for 
testing the effects of the state law. 
The following features illustrate the novelty of this study: 
1) It examines multiple facets of state SBC laws 
2) It examines the effect of the SBC laws using data that is the most reliable in 
sorting out small firms.  
3) It attempts to examine the effect of SBC in a unique fashion by utilizing a panel 
data set over various industries.  
4) It attempts to exploit the differences among state laws and examine the combined 
impact of fair trade laws and SBC laws on small businesses.  
Part B of this chapter explains the dependent variables chosen to represent the 
presence of small businesses. Part C of this chapter explains the explanatory variables used 
in the study. Part D contains a description of the SBC dummy variables chosen and Part E 
explains the functional form of the tests. Part F presents the results of the study, and Part G 
concludes this chapter. 
B. The Dependent Variables 
I use three different data sets to measure small businesses. I use three data sets 
because no one data set was thorough enough to perform all the analyses in this chapter. I 
wanted a definitive data set that measured the number of small firms by state from a period 
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of time when states enacted the laws to the present. Unfortunately, each data set only had 
some of the characteristics I desired, which led me to utilize a combination of data sets.   
The first set of dependent variables based on firm size was created from data 
contained in the Census of Business for 1929-1967. Eight Censuses were produced during 
this period of time.116 I ended this data set in the year 1967 because the Census ceased 
providing state specific data on single establishment retailers in the following years.  
Data for grocery stores and variety stores were available in every time period. Data 
for the remaining industries examined were available for seven of the eight years. Over this 
time period, I examined several industries, including: grocery stores (SIC 541), variety 
stores (SIC 533), tire stores (SIC 553), furniture stores (SIC 5712) and hardware stores 
(SIC 5251). Unlike previous studies of state SBC laws, I do not include the retail gasoline 
sector. Many states enact specific gasoline SBC statutes. The effect of these product line 
specific laws may alter the effect on small businesses apart from the general SBC law. 
I omit Alaska and Hawaii from the data set because they were not states in some of 
the years contained in the sample. I define small businesses to be firms that owned exactly 
one establishment in the 1929-1967 sample. All establishments owned by a firm that 
operated any other establishments are large establishments for purpose of this study.  
The second measure I use to identify small and large businesses is data that depicts 
establishment size based on the total number of employees per establishment. This data 
was available on an annual basis from the County Business Patterns database at the 
                                                 




University of Virginia for the years 1977-1997.117 I examined the national distribution of 
firms across the various employment sizes, and parsed the data into small or large 
establishments in order to calculate the percentage of small businesses using these data. 
The high threshold for defining a large business was chosen because only the larger firms 
with adequate resources to absorb losses in the short-run will likely pursue predation.118 
The five industries examined in this context were: Building materials & garden supplies 
(SIC 52); Food stores (SIC 54); Automotive dealers & service stations (SIC 55); General 
merchandise stores (SIC 53); and Furniture and home furnishings stores (SIC 57). 
It is important to examine the SBC laws and this time period because the major 
transformation of federal predatory pricing laws changed after 1975 with the acceptance of 
the Areeda-Turner article. During these years, courts made proving predatory pricing 
conduct illegal very difficult. The state law should be an alternative remedy for small firms; 
so small firms should utilize the state laws more during these years if they perceive 
potential illegal pricing by dominant firms. Thus, the tests for this time period should 
capture whether firms used the state law as an alternative to the federal law in predatory 
pricing cases.   
The last set of dependent variables is data on the total number of establishments for 
the same industries I examined in the years 1929-1967. I used the data available in every 
Census of Retail Trade.119 I do not consider this data as satisfactory as the other data sets, 
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because large firms often operate multiple retail establishments, and this data set does not 
distinguish between establishments operated by large or small firms. However, a market 
dominated by large firms should not operate as many stores as many small competitors 
theoretically.  
C. Legislative Variables 
 The details of the laws differ across states, and the effectiveness of a law in 
protecting small businesses may well depend on these details. Important differences among 
the laws include treble damages, the constitutionality of the laws and whether the laws 
contain a minimum markup provision. I tested the effectiveness of the laws without any 
attributes, as well as the effectiveness of the law when coupled with state specific 
attributes. In addition, the effectiveness of these laws was also tested in conjunction with 
other small business legislation (the fair trade laws) and with alterations in interpretation of 
federal predatory pricing legislation to examine whether other laws were responsible for the 
presence of small firms, or whether the state law became more viable as federal protection 
diminished. 
a. Minimum Markup Provisions 
Small firms get the primary benefit of minimum markup provisions because it 
removes the vagueness or ambiguity associated with determining whether a plaintiff has 
priced below cost. This attribute of an SBC law may encourage small firms to pursue 
action under the statute since replacement cost of an item may be easily discovered and 




may be difficult to discern if the state did not enact a provision requiring a specified 
markup.   
  In the sample period from 1929-1967, twenty-one states had SBC laws with 
markup provisions and nine had no markup provisions. California and Idaho enacted these 
provisions in the 1950s, after the initial law was adopted. In the sample 1977-1997, fifteen 
states had minimum markup provisions and eight did not. Arizona had a markup provision 
and Washington did not, but both repealed the SBC law during the sample. Wisconsin 
repealed its markup provision during the sample. Thus, the markup provision is not simply 
a measure of state fixed effects.  
b. Treble Damages 
Treble damages are another attribute of many of the state enactments that vary 
according to jurisdiction. Many states allow treble damages to plaintiffs harmed by the 
below cost sales tactics of the defendant. States enacting such provisions created a SBC law 
that carries the same damages as the federal antitrust statutes. Given that the evidentiary 
requirements under the state law are less than the federal law, the state law with treble 
damages provides a better alternative for small firms to defend against predatory pricing. In 
the previous chapter, I illustrated that the federal laws are not effective with respect to 
deterring loss leader sales. This means that the state law will likely be the chosen remedy 
against loss leader sales, regardless of treble damages. However, treble damages will 
ensure that the state law provides a superior remedy to the federal law. Thus, a significant 
treble damage provision likely indicates that the state laws are effectively deterring 




In the sample period from 1929-1967, twenty-one states had SBC laws with treble 
damages and nine had no provision for treble damages. California enacted this provision in 
the 1950s, after the initial law was adopted. In the sample 1977-1997, fourteen states had 
minimum markup provisions and nine did not. Neither Arizona nor Washington allowed 
for treble damages, but both repealed the law during the sample. Thus, treble damages are 
not simply a measure of state fixed effects. 
c. Constitutionality of the SBC Laws 
Courts frequently attack the SBC laws on the basis of unconstitutionality. The 
constitutional challenges have varied from violations of due process to vagueness into a 
state’s definition of cost. Courts may declare the laws unconstitutional in whole or part. 
Legislative responses to the court action vary. Some states chose to let the law remain with 
the defect; some states chose to later repeal the legislation, and some states enacted 
provisions (or new laws) correcting the constitutional defect.  
d. Fair Trade Enactments 
In the sample period from 1929-1967, twenty states had SBC laws not deemed 
unconstitutional, and ten state laws were deemed unconstitutional. However, five of these 
states later remedied the defect in the law. In the sample 1977-1997, nineteen states had 
constitutionally valid provisions and four did not. Arizona and Washington both repealed 
the law during the sample, and Arizona was one of four states with a law deemed 
unconstitutional. 
Fair trade acts were another important type of law passed by states to protect small 
businesses in the chain store era of the 1930s. Fair trade acts allowed retailers and upstream 




constitute Sherman §1 violations as resale price maintenance schemes, however in 1937 
Congress enacted the Miller-Tydings Amendment allowing states to enact legislation 
permitting contracts between vertically related firms setting minimum resale prices. This 
legislation was hindered in several states by courts invalidating the non-signor provisions 
of the fair trade acts. The non-signor provisions allow upstream firms to contractually 
require that downstream firms not sell below a certain price. These provisions were a 
significant piece of the fair trade legislation because the provisions were the primary means 
by which a firm could enforce the minimum resale price. The fair trade legislation was 
incorporated into the regressions by evaluating whether a state enacted a fair trade law, 
whether the non-signor provision of the fair trade law was valid and whether the state also 
had a SBC law.  
Twenty-nine states contained provisions for sales below cost and fair trade 
agreements with non-signor provisions at some point during the sample. Eleven states had 
sales below cost laws with fair trade agreements not containing non-signor provisions at 
some point during the sample. Twenty-eight states contained provisions for fair trade 
agreements with non-signor provisions at some point during the sample. Seven states 
contained provisions for fair trade agreements without non-signor provisions at some point 
during the sample, and six states only had SBC laws during the sample period. Thus, these 
terms do not simply represent state fixed effects. 
e. Predatory Pricing Case Law 
           The Matsushita decision in 1986 and the Brooke decision in 1993 were major 
precedents that altered the application of the federal predatory pricing laws. The current 




probability of recoupment under the Sherman Act. The Brooke case aligned the conduct of 
predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act more closely with the Sherman Act.120 A 
plaintiff must now show that the defendant has a reasonable prospect of recoupment under 
the Robinson Patman Act. Evidence to prove this assertion is likely difficult to acquire, 
even if such a probability exists in reality. Given that this requirement limits a firm’s 
protection under the federal laws, the SBC laws can plausibly be use to fill the gap, 
eliminating conduct that the federal laws now condone. The tests on these variables should 
be significant and greater than the results on general SBC laws if they deter predatory 
pricing. However, if the theory that firms do not have incentive to sue when other firms 
have incentive to prey, the effects of the SBC laws after Matsushita and Brooke should be 
no greater than the standard test of the SBC laws. 
f. Legislative Variables Defined 
Below is a list and definition of the variants of SBC laws used in this study:  
SBC- This is a dummy variable which equals one if state that had a general SBC law during 
a given year. This variable should increase small businesses if SBC laws provide effective 
protection for small businesses. This variable provides a test of general effectiveness of the 
laws. 
YRSSBC- An integer variable equal to the number of periods since the state's SBC law was 
enacted. This variable allows the impact of a SBC variable to change over time rather than 
remaining a binary dummy variable in every period. I intend for this variable to capture 
whether the SBC law has a larger effect the longer the law remains intact. I suspected that 
                                                 
120 The Robinson-Patman Act was passed in a time when the protection of small business was considered a valid antitrust 
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laws gain public awareness the longer they remain active. Perhaps even more important is 
the fact that legislative intent is not always congruent with judicial interpretation. Laws that 
remain active are more likely to establish precedent that further clarifies the boundaries of 
the law. 
Markup- This dummy variable equals one if the state has a general SBC law with a 
provision in the law that sales must include a minimum markup. 
No Markup- This dummy variable equals one if the state has a general SBC law but does 
not contain a provision in the law that firms must include a minimum markup in the price. 
Constitutional- A dummy variable that equals one if the courts have not ruled the SBC law 
unconstitutional. Laws that the legislature amends to correct unconstitutional defects with 
prior enactments are also counted as constitutional. 
Unconstitutional- A dummy variable that equals one if the state’s highest court has ruled 
the law unconstitutional in whole or part. The variable reverts back to 0 when and if the 
state legislature corrects the defect in the law. 
Treble- A dummy variable that equals one if the state has a SBC law that contains a 
provision for treble damages if the statute is violated. 
No Treble- A dummy variable that equals one if the state has a SBC law that does not 
contain a provision for treble damages if the statute is violated. 
 The following legislative variables examine the effect of fair trade legislation: 
ALL- A dummy variable equaling one if a state has both an SBC law and a fair trade law 




SBCFT- A dummy variable equaling one if a state has both an SBC law and a fair trade 
law. However, the state’s fair trade law did not allow for the use of non-signor agreements, 
or the non-signor agreement had been deemed unconstitutional. 
FTNS- A dummy variable equaling one if a state has both a fair trade law that allows for  
use of non-signor agreements. These states do not have SBC laws enacted. 
FT- A dummy variable equaling one if a state has a fair trade law, but does not prevent 
below-cost sales. The state’s fair trade law does not contain a provision allowing the use of 
non-signor agreements, or the non-signor agreement has been deemed unconstitutional. 
SBCO- A dummy variable equaling one if a state has a fair trade law, but it either does not 
have a fair trade law or the fair trade law has been deemed unconstitutional. 
 The following legislative variables measure how the change in the interpretation of 
the federal law impacts the state law: 
Matsushita and Brooke- these variables are time dummy variables applied to states with 
SBC laws after each respective case. The variables relate to the effectiveness of the state 
statutes after two significant federal predatory pricing cases.  
D. The Explanatory Variables 
I included other variables to accurately represent the effect of state SBC laws on 
small businesses. I chose the variables primarily based on the existing literature. They 
represent factors relevant to the prevalence of large or small businesses.        
The control variables employed are as follows: 
Population, The population of each state.  This variable is only applicable to the 




obtained from the Census Bureau for each year relevant to the models. The total number of 
establishments in a state should obviously increase with population. Therefore, population 
should be positively correlated with the total number of establishments. 
PCPI, The per capita income of every state, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I 
adjusted the data for inflation using the GDP implicit price deflator. Larger incomes per 
capita are likely to attract large retail firms into the market and increase the total number of 
establishments, because consumers have more disposable income to spend at retail 
establishments. As with population, the effect of income on small businesses is somewhat 
ambiguous because while larger incomes represent greater spending potential, consumers 
may also demand more specialized goods and better service as opposed to cheap mass-
produced goods as income increases. 
Retail, Nominal per capita retail sales for every state, which is taken from the Census of 
Retail Trade. I also adjusted the retail data for inflation using the GDP implicit price 
deflator. The data for retail sales were divided by the population for the corresponding year 
to construct this variable. The Census does not provide data for retail sales on yearly basis. 
It was only available in the same years as the Census of Retail Trade, so I linearly 
interpolated this data for years that retail sales did not correspond to the dependent variable. 
Larger retail sales are likely to induce large firms into the market and should be negatively 
correlated with the percentage of small businesses in a state.  
Urban, The percentage of residents living in urban areas. Annual values for this variable 




large retail firms to a particular market. This variable should also be negatively correlated 
with the dependent variables. 
Time, Year dummy variables for the different years included in each data set. The variable 
controls for business cycle effects and other year specific shocks. A time dummy variable 
was added for every time observation, not for every year that passed in the sample. 
E. Functional Form 
 I estimate a basic linear model with panel data and the principal issue is whether 
state fixed effects should be included in the model. This application of fixed effects is 
also consistent with the literature testing the effects of SBC laws in a panel data set. 
Skidmore (2005) discussed three reasons why the fixed effects model is appropriate for 
testing a panel data set pertaining to state SBC laws. First, they found that much of the 
difference between mark-ups is between states, and the permanent differences between 
states can be captured with fixed effects. Although my model does not measure prices or 
markups, many of the same differences between the percentages of small businesses 
occur between states. Second, omitting state effects would yield estimates that do not 
reflect the true effect of the law. Third, a fixed effects model is a within group estimator 
that uses within state variation to form parameter estimates. This estimate can examine 
the effect within the state as the legal climate changes.121 Their application of the fixed 
effects model is consistent with the objectives of this analysis and is the appropriate 
specification to test whether state SBC laws protect small businesses. 
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The functional form of the regression model was tested and specified before 
including SBC variables in the regressions. The purpose of testing for the functional form 
was to determine whether the model should be examined using a state fixed effects model 
or a single constant. Fixed effects could be appropriate because there are non-time 
varying features of each state, which may not be accounted for in the control variables 
(e.g. states enact other laws that may have an effect on the number of small businesses.) 
The first step in the process was to perform a regression of the explanatory variables on 
the dependent variable. I then performed a redundant fixed effects test to examine 
whether the fixed effects were overlapping or tended to explain the same phenomenon. I 
tested the null hypothesis that the state effects were redundant. The for the dependent 
variables in every industry revealed the same finding that the null hypothesis could be 
rejected at any critical value, suggesting that the proper functional from should include 
state fixed effects.122  
  
I can then assume that the functional form of the model is: 
%Smallit= γSBCit + xitβ + αi + ηt +εit.   
where αi  represents the state fixed effects and ηt represents the time effects. Of course, one 
time dummy is not included to avoid multicollinearity. Xit represents the explanatory 
                                                 
122 The Chi-Squared statistics for the redundant variables tests are as follows:  
 In the sample 1927-1967 the statistics were 227.26, 356.88, 236, 102.18, 278.38 with 47 degrees of freedom for the 
grocery, variety, hardware, furniture, and tire markets respectively, yielding a p-value of 0.0000 for all tests.  
 In the sample 1977-1997 the statistics were 1500.74, 1317.30, 1167.33, 1381.54, 1052.88 with 49 degrees of freedom 
for the general merchandise, food, automotive, building materials, and furniture markets respectively, yielding a p-value 
of 0.0000 for all tests.  
 In the sample 1927-1997 the statistics were 170.16, 515.10, 121.13, 328.81 with 47 degrees of freedom for the variety, 




variables for state i in time t. SBCit represents the status of the law in state i at time t. The 
model is slightly different when I account for variations of the law rather than using a 
simple SBC dummy variable. For instance, two dummy variables are used to test whether 
treble damages affect the percentage of businesses.123 β and γ are coefficient vectors and εit 
is the error term for model. 
  I assumed that the data were robust in heteroskedasticity, given the nature of the 
cross-sectional component of the data. Nevertheless, I tested variances for equality. I 
utilized the Bartlett test for homoskedasticity. The variances were heteroskedastic as the 
null hypothesis that the variances were homoskedastic was rejected at the five percent level 
for all tests performed.124 As a result of the robust standard errors, I utilized White Standard 






















ii xxxxexx  to estimate the true variance of the OLS estimator.
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 Another pertinent issue with respect to testing these laws is in regards to 
endogeniety. In particular, did the presence of a SBC law protect small firms, or did the 
presence of small firms result in the legislative enactments? Skidmore (2005) illustrates 
                                                 
123 The following are the interaction terms used together in the same regressions: 1) Treble and No Treble; 2) 
Constitutional and Unconstitutional; 3) Markup and No Markup; 4) All, SBCFT, FTNS, FT, and SBCO. These 
variables are not cross-tested. For instance, the variable treble is never interacted with the markup dummy variable.  
124 The Chi-Squared statistics for the Bartlett tests are as follows:  
 In the sample 1927-1967 the statistics were 151.75, 157.11, 239.93, 344.23, 89.97 with 47 degrees of freedom for the 
grocery, variety, hardware, furniture, and tire markets respectively, yielding a p-value of 0.0000 for all tests except the 
test for the tire industry which yielded a value of .0002.  
 In the sample 1977-1997 the statistics were 333.59, 277.10, 426.47, 313.19, 288.5 with 49 degrees of freedom for the 
general merchandise, food, automotive, building materials, and furniture markets respectively, yielding a p-value of 
0.0000 for all tests.  
 In the sample 1927-1997 the statistics were 1187.49, 331.56, 748.62, 893.21 with 47 degrees of freedom for the variety, 




that high prices did not cause SBC laws, but that creation of SBC laws was correlated with 
democratic officials in office. They utilized a Hausman test that resulted in a failure to 
reject the null hypothesis that the SBC variable was exogenous to price markups. The 
authors also test the effects of SBC laws on market structure and treat the SBC law as 
exogenous to the total number of establishments. This supports my treatment of the SBC 
laws as exogenous variables. Additionally, all of the current literature on empirical testing 
of SBC laws treats the laws as exogenous.126  
 In addition to the literature, I controlled for minimum markup provisions enacted 
with some state SBC laws. This particular variable is useful for examining whether the law 
effective on its own merits because the provision does not make the SBC law more 
stringent. All states make provisions requiring firms to price above average total cost. The 
markup provision does make identifying below cost sales easier because it assigns a value 
to fixed costs.127 Thus, the provision may encourage more litigation, but does not appear to 
be a provision that was adopted to favor small firms above and beyond the basic SBC law. 
 Grocery Stores are likely the most important industry tested in this paper. Grocery 
stores typically sell many different products with a fairly high volume. They also have the 
potential to attract many repeat customers because they sell non-durable goods. Retailers in 
this industry have a strong incentive to initially attract many consumers into the store as a 
result. Thus, grocery stores are one form of business likely to use loss leaders. If SBC laws 
                                                                                                                                                 
125 Marno Verbeek, A Guide to Modern Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2000, p. 81. 
126 Skidmore, supra note 119, at 195. 





have been effective at protecting small businesses, the grocery store industry should be as 
strong an indicator as any in the retail market.  
 Durable goods are also an industry of importance in this model. Sellers of durable 
goods are not likely to engage in predatory pricing because the long-run payoff does not 
merit selling the good below cost. This will render the state law irrelevant even if the state 
law effectively protects small firms.  
 
F. Results 
 The results are broken into three categories: First, whether the SBC laws are 
successful in protecting small businesses. Second, whether defining characteristics of each 
state’s legislative enactment alters the effectiveness of the SBC legislation. Third, whether 
external factors to the SBC enactments such as fair-trade laws or changes in the federal 
laws affect the results. Summaries of the results are presented in Figure 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3. 
1. General SBC Laws 
a. SBC Dummy Only 
 Figure 4-4 (A) illustrates the effect that general SBC laws have on small businesses, 
as measured by data on single and multi-unit firms. The data I used for this regression is 
from the Census of Business from 1929-1967. The coefficient (β) of each explanatory 
variable is given for every industry tested, as well as the SBC law coefficient (γ) and the 
corresponding p-values for the null hypothesis that SBC laws bear no correlation to the 
percentage of small businesses in a state. I reject this hypothesis if the p-values are not 




 The explanatory variables tested in conjunction with grocery stores all have 
negative coefficients, but only urbanization tested significant. All other explanatory 
variables were found to have little impact on the prevalence of small grocery stores. The 
SBC variable is positive and significant in the grocery store market. This suggests that the 
state laws do have a tendency to protect small businesses in the grocery industry. However, 
the results suggest that the presence of a SBC law creates a one percent increase in the 
number of small grocery stores. Thus, in a state such as California that had approximately 
10,000 small grocery stores during the sample period, only about one hundred and twenty 
of those, or six stores for every one million people, are due to the SBC law.  
 Hardware stores and variety stores are also primary candidates for examining the 
effect of SBC laws because both of these sellers supply multiple products that are not 
durable, which may lead to loss leader selling. The effects of SBC laws were positive and 
significant in promoting small businesses in both the variety store and hardware industries, 
although the magnitude of the coefficients were relatively small at two percent. These 
results again suggest that SBC laws protect small businesses in these markets, but they 
certainly did not prevent entry by larger firms. For example, in 1967 each state had an 
average of 235 variety stores, so the point estimate suggests that a SBC law led to an extra 
5 small firms in the average state. Per capita income and urbanization appear to be the 
primary factors and inducing large firms into the variety store market, whereas per capita 
income and per capita retail sales were the main factors contributing to entry by large firms 




 SBC laws do not appear to protect small businesses in both the tire and furniture 
store markets, as the SBC dummy variable was not significant at the ten percent level for 
either industry. Retail sales was the only significant explanatory variable in either market. It 
was negatively related to small tire stores. Loss leaders should not be as frequent in these 
markets because these retailers characteristically sell fewer goods than the other firms in 
the study, and those goods are often durable. Therefore, the results in these industries 
should not be as robust to legislation prohibiting sales below cost as the other three 
markets. In my opinion, the varieties of items carried by tire and furniture of stores are 
more likely to be substitutes rather than complements or unrelated goods, which are not an 
optimal product mix for loss leader selling. However, the SBC variables should show some 
trace of significance if predatory pricing is a common practice in these markets and the 
laws are effective at preventing the behavior.  
 Figure 4-4 (B) demonstrates the effect of the sales below cost laws and the 
explanatory variables on the percentage of small firms, using a different data set that 
depicts establishment size as a function of employment from 1977-1997.  
 Figure 4-4 (B) shows that the SBC laws did protect small businesses in the food, 
general merchandise and automotive markets, as the SBC dummy variable tested positive 
and significant in all of these industries. The extent to which the SBC laws shielded small 
businesses in these industries is questionable. The results illustrate that the laws increased 
the percentage of small businesses between .9 and 2.7%. In the furniture and building 





 With respect to the explanatory variables, per capita retail sales was a negative and 
significant determinant in every industry examined.  Urbanization had a negative and 
significant effect on the percentage of small businesses in the industries where SBC laws 
were most effective, but urbanization was not a factor that increased the presence of large 
firms in either the furniture or the building materials industries. Unlike the other 
explanatory variables, per capita income was a positive determinant of small business 
success in the food and general merchandise industries.  However, per capita income 
significantly decreased the presence of small businesses in the market for building 
materials.  The variable is insignificant in both the automotive and furniture industries. 
 Figure 4-4 (C) illustrates the effect of SBC laws on the total number of 
establishments in a state from 1929-1997. The SBC law significantly affected states’ total 
number of establishments in the tire and furniture industries. There were forty-four more 
establishments in the tire industry and one hundred and forty-seven fewer establishments in 
the furniture industry in states that enacted sales below cost laws. The laws had no effect on 
the total number of establishments in any other industry. Typically, the explanatory 
variables per-capita retail sales and the percentage of individuals living in urbanized areas 
increased the total number of establishment when the variables were significant. Per-capita 
income tended to decrease the total number of establishments when significant. 
 The test of the effectiveness of the SBC laws yields some interesting results. This 
test evaluates the hypotheses proposed in the previous chapter. One hypothesis was that 
state laws are strictly superior in deterring loss leader sales, and that those sales were most 




from large firms clearly show that SBC laws increase the percentage of small firms in both 
the grocery/food and variety/general merchandise markets. The law also increased the 
percentage of small businesses in the hardware store industry in the sample from 1929-
1967. The auto industry also showed a positive and significant relationship between the law 
and small firms when the market was expanded beyond just the tire market in 1977-1997. 
The law did not make sizeable changes in the composition of small firms in those markets 
though. The SBC law had a maximum effect of increasing small businesses by 2.7%. In the 
other industries the effect of the SBC law was negligible. Thus, while the effect of the SBC 
law on small businesses was minimal, the law was most effective in industries that 
commonly sell multiple products and appear prone to loss leader sales. 
While the results show that the SBC law deters loss leader sales, its ability to deter 
predatory pricing is questionable. Of the four industries that show some correlation 
between SBC laws and small firms, only the variety/general merchandise stores should 
exhibit predatory pricing behavior if the theory I present in the last chapter is accurate.  
I would expect to see predatory pricing occur more frequently in industries that are 
more concentrated, as the payoff to predation is higher when the market contains elements 
of market power. In fact, firms must be able to deter entry into the market for predatory 
pricing to be effective. Additionally, durable goods industries should not be as prone to 
predatory pricing.  
The results show that sales below cost laws do increase the percentage of small 
firms in industries that are the most concentrated in the sample. Variety stores are the most 




from 1929-1997, and hardware stores are the second most concentrated market with 580 
stores. The SBC law positively influenced the number of small firms in these markets. In 
fact, the SBC laws had the largest effect in the variety/general merchandise markets. 
However, hardware stores frequently sell durable goods, which are not ideal for 
implementing predatory pricing. 
 Whether the law deters predatory pricing is still questionable. The law affects the 
grocery, variety, and hardware store markets, but all these industries are prone to loss 
leader sales. The law also affected the automotive industry when the market was expanded 
to include larger product lines. Of these industries, grocery stores are not concentrated, and 
predatory pricing should not occur frequently. The hardware and automotive markets are 
somewhat concentrated compared to grocery or furniture stores, but both are durable goods 
retailers. The variety store market should exhibit predatory pricing, if it is indeed rational, 
and SBC laws did have the most significant impact in this market.    
b.  Length of Active SBC Legislation 
 I next test whether the length of time a state has had a SBC law affects the impact 
of the law using the YRSSBC variable. I weighted the dummy variables to determine 
whether the effect of sales below cost laws are more pronounced as the law remains viable.  
Figures 4-5 (A) and (B) depict the results obtained from the tests for 1929-1967 and 1977 
and 1997 respectively. 
 The sales below cost laws produce slightly different results than the regressions 
with binary sales below cost variables when I accounted for the length of time the law was 
active. The effect that the YRSSBC variable has on the percentage of small businesses is 




of small businesses in the food, grocery, and hardware industries; however, the duration of 
the SBC law did not significantly affect small firms in the variety store market and 
negatively impacted small firms in the general merchandise market. This result is 
questionable because the general SBC laws had the largest effect on the variety/general 
merchandise markets.  
In the grocery store market, the SBC law resulted in .4% additional small firms per 
observation period.  Thus, a state that has maintained a SBC law for the entire thirty-seven 
year sample period has approximately two percent more small grocery stores than states 
that never enacted a SBC law. In the food, variety, and hardware industries, the states with 
SBC laws have approximately a .1, .3, and .5 percent increase in the percentage of small 
businesses respectively, for every period that the law was effective. The YRSSBC variable 
was also positively and significantly correlated with the percentage of small establishments 
in the furniture industry (for the sample period 1929-1967), producing an additional .6 
percent of small firms for every period that the law was effective. This result is surprising 
because the durable nature of furniture is unlikely to induce predatory behavior, and the 
nature of the furniture business does not appear conducive to loss leader pricing.   
The effects of the explanatory variables were similar to the SBC dummy variable 
regressions with only two exceptions.  Per capita income became insignificant in the 
grocery store market and population became insignificant in the tire market.   
2. Variations of the State SBC laws 
a. Minimum Markup Provisions 
 The first feature of state SBC laws I examine is a minimum markup provision. The 




the invoice or replacement cost of the good, plus an additional markup, or the cost of doing 
business. States can opt to require that firms price above cost by a specified percentage to 
account for the cost of doing business. The required markup varies by state. This provision 
is only valuable in that it gives small firms a measuring stick to evaluate whether a 
competitor prices below statutory cost, because all states include fixed cost within their 
definition of cost and firms can get around the markup provision by proving a lower actual 
fixed cost.  
 Figures 4-6 (A)-(C) illustrate the results of SBC laws controlling for minimum 
markup provisions. With the exception of the sample from 1929-1997 that used total 
establishments as a dependent variable, the minimum markup provisions protected small 
businesses. The minimum markup provision was never significant and negative, and it was 
always larger in magnitude than no markup provision when it was significant. It was also 
positive and significant in every industry where a general SBC law was significant. The 
size of the impact of the minimum markup provisions was noticeable as well. The effect of 
the SBC law was larger for states enacting a minimum markup provision in every industry, 
than the effect of a general SBC law alone. For the sample 1929-1967, the minimum 
markup provision increased the presence of small firms by .5, .4, and .5 percent in the 
grocery, variety, and hardware markets respectively, above states with only a SBC 
enactment. In the sample 1977-1997, the minimum markup provision increased the 
presence of small firms beyond the basic SBC law protection by 1.7, 1.6, and .4 percent in 
the food, general merchandise, and automotive markets respectively. Additionally, SBC 




provisions, while the SBC laws without markup provisions protected small firms to a lesser 
extent in the general merchandise and automotive markets, as the presence of small firms 
was 2.9 and .9 percent lower respectively, in states that did not contain the markup 
provision. The regressions measuring the total number of establishments from 1929-1997 
again yielded unsatisfactory results.  
The only industries not impacted by SBC laws with minimum markup enactments 
are the tire, building materials, and furniture markets. Additionally, states that enacted an 
SBC law without a minimum markup provision created virtually empty legislation. The 
SBC laws without minimum markups were only positive and significant in two industries 
examined in the regressions from 1929-1969 and 1977-1997. These results indicate that 
having a well-defined meaning for the appropriate level of cost drastically increased the 
effectiveness of the statutes in promoting the percentage of small businesses in a state.   
b. Treble Damages 
 Figure 4-7(A) reports that SBC laws containing provisions for treble damages do 
not protect small firms in the grocery, variety, and tire industries. The Treble variable did 
not test positive and significant in each of these industries in the data set on total 
establishments from 1929-1997. In fact, small firms were more prevalent in states that had 
SBC laws without treble damages in the grocery market. This result in the grocery industry 
would tend to suggest that other attributes of the laws (such as constitutionality and 
minimum markup provisions) possibly contribute more to the effectiveness of the law than 
the magnitude of the damage award. 
 Treble damages were a significant factor in the perseverance of small firms in both 




prevalence of small businesses than the general SBC variable in the hardware industry. The 
presence of treble damages increases the percentage of small firms by approximately 5.3%. 
This result is rather a persuasive argument for whether the state laws deter predatory 
pricing, since the general law only increased the percentage of small firms by 1.6%. 
Additionally, states with SBC enactments that failed to impose treble damages did not 
increase the percentage of small businesses in the hardware industry. The Treble variable 
also tested both positive and significant in the furniture industry. SBC laws with treble 
damages had approximately 4.9% more small firms, whereas general SBC laws did not 
significantly increase the percentage of small firms in the market. This result is quite 
interesting because the it suggests that the damages actually incurred are not sufficient to 
increase the percentage of small businesses, however treble damages were enough to either 
deter below cost pricing practices, deter large firm entry, or induce entry by small firms.   
 The SBC law did increase the percentage of small firms in both the hardware and 
furniture markets. The furniture market should not be prone to either loss leaders or 
predatory pricing; yet larger damages did protect smaller firms. This suggests that loss 
leader selling or predatory pricing schemes may be more prevalent in this industry than 
suspected.     
 The data set measuring the total number of establishments from 1929-1997 
produced interesting results with respect to treble damages. The SBC law alone was not 
effective in deterring below cost sales. However, treble damage provisions were 
responsible for making an ineffective SBC law viable in the grocery and hardware 




greater protection for small firms than the state law, except when the state law has a treble 
damage provision.   
 These results present mixed results in determining whether the state laws actually 
deter predatory pricing. Based on the theory in chapter four and the tests on the effect of the 
general SBC law, I expected loss leaders to exist in the grocery, variety store, and hardware 
store markets. Additionally, the variety store market should be the most likely to exhibit 
acts of predatory pricing, given the structure and product offerings of these markets. 
However, treble damages actually decreased the effectiveness of the SBC law in the variety 
store market. This tends to support the hypothesis that the federal or state law is not 
preventing predatory pricing in the variety store market. However, in the hardware, 
furniture, and grocery industries, the data show evidence that the laws do deter predatory 
pricing. The hardware industry provides the best evidence that the law deters predatory 
pricing because the treble damage is significant in both data sets. In the test regarding the 
antitrust cases Matsushita and Brooke below, I further illustrate this finding.  
 
c. Constitutionality of SBC laws 
 The results of the regressions on SBC laws with consideration given to court 
decisions are illustrated in Figure 4-8 (A)-(B). The constitutionality of a SBC law has only 
marginally affected the effectiveness of the laws. Over the period 1929-1967, the 
constitutionality of the laws did improve the states’ effectiveness at promoting small 
businesses in both the grocery industry, as the variable constitutional was greater than the 
general SBC variable, and the unconstitutional variable was insignificant. In the hardware 




variable, but the unconstitutional variable was not significant, suggesting that a law must be 
constitutional to be effective. In the variety store market, the constitutional variable was 
insignificant while the unconstitutional variable was large and significant. This result is not 
consistent with the expected effect of constitutionality of the SBC law. As general SBC 
laws had no effect on the percentage of small businesses in the tire and furniture markets, 
neither did the constitutionality of the laws.     
In the sample 1977-1997, the variable Constitutional had a positive and significant 
relationship with the percentage of small businesses in the automotive industry; however, 
favorable interpretation of the laws did not improve the effectiveness of the statute in either 
the food or general merchandise markets. In fact, the unconstitutional variable was more 
significant in these industries. The constitutional variable was more consistent with 
expectations in the other industries. The law was significant and positive in the building 
materials industry. This industry did not test significant under the test of the general SBC 
law. The constitutional variable was the same as effectiveness of the general SBC variable 
in the automotive industry, but unconstitutional laws were less effective. Also, the 
constitutional variable was insignificant in the furniture industry, but unconstitutional laws 
resulted in fewer small businesses than states without a SBC law.  
3. Factors External to SBC Legislation 
a. Fair Trade Enactments 
The results in figure 4-9 illustrate that fair trade laws used in conjunction with SBC laws 
produced significant results in only two industries. In the grocery industry, the results show 
that the enactment of sales below cost laws coupled with fair trade acts containing non-




in a state. The effects, however, were small, increasing the percentage of small firms by 
about one percent, which is only slightly greater than the effect of a general SBC law. 
Small businesses in the hardware industry were positively affected by both the enactment 
the enactment of a SBC law alone, or a SBC law coupled with a fair trade enactment 
without a valid non-signor clause. This result is somewhat suspect given that non-signor 
clauses should not diminish the value of the fair trade act. Additionally, the presence of 
both a fair trade act and a SBC law should not produce results of a smaller magnitude than 
stand-alone SBC enactments. However, the results demonstrate that SBC laws without fair 
trade legislation had the largest impact on the percentage of small businesses in the 
hardware market.  
 These results were similar in the furniture industry, as the significant variables 
increasing the percentage of small businesses were combinations of SBC or fair trade 
legislation without non-signor clauses. This suggests that non-signor clauses actually 
harmed small businesses in the furniture market. 
b. Predatory Pricing Case Law       
 Figure 4-10 (a) shows the results of the tests using the data set from 1977-1997. 
The impact of SBC laws during the two periods appears to be negligible across the five 
industries. The Matsushita case only appears to have distinguished states with SBC laws in 
two industries. In the food and furniture industry, the variable appears positive and 
significant. The holding in Brooke was also positive and significant in the food industry, 
but negative and significant in the general merchandise market. While the two cases were 




variable. Taken as a whole, it appears as though the cases did not drastically affect the 
application or effectiveness of the state laws.  
 In the data set containing total establishments from 1929-1997, the Matsushita 
variable was positive and significant in the grocery and hardware industries. This result is 
interesting because the SBC variable alone did not increase the number of establishments in 
either industry. Given that the treble damage provision was significant in both these 






C h a p t e r  5  
CONCLUSIONS 
 The purpose and intent of state SBC laws does not mirror that of federal predatory 
pricing. State laws have always purported to protect small businesses. Sales below cost 
laws should theoretically protect small businesses when loss leader selling is prominent and 
when the law is known to produce a significantly better defense against predatory pricing.  
The results do indicate that the state laws likely deter predatory pricing in the 
hardware industry, and possible protects against the behavior in the grocery and furniture 
industries. Treble damage provisions should make the state laws preferable to the federal 
laws, and the small business should find the state laws a favorable alternative after the 
Court’s decision in Matsushita. Both treble damages and the Matsushita effect account for 
a larger percentage of small businesses in the hardware industry. Treble damages and the 
Matsushita effect are also significant for the grocery industry in the data set from 1929-
1997, and in the furniture industry in the two data sets measuring the percentage of small 
businesses. These results suggest that SBC laws do in fact serve to protect small firms from 
predatory pricing in some industries.  
It does appear that the laws do deter loss leader pricing to an extent as well. States 
with SBC laws did have a greater percentage of small businesses in the grocery, variety 
store, and hardware store markets. Additionally, the law was even more effective when 




expected to engage in loss leader selling, due to their diverse product offerings. 
Additionally, the laws remained effective as I expanded the market definitions. The 
percentage of small firms was greater in states with SBC laws in the food, general 
merchandise, and automotive markets. The minimum markup provision also increased the 
effectiveness of the law in these industries.   
These results suggest that SBC laws do protect small firms to a small extent from 
loss leader pricing and predatory pricing. This result is apparent from the fact that SBC 
laws deter predation in certain industries when the law provides damages equivalent to the 
federal laws, or after the Court began applying more stringent standards to the federal laws. 
Additionally, the Sherman Act was not designed to prevent loss leader selling. In this 
respect, the state laws do appear to protect firms in industries where such conduct may be 



















Effects of SBC Laws from 1929-1967 
 
 Grocery  Variety Hardware Tire Furniture 
SBC Law 1.2% 2.5% 1.6% NS NS 
YRSSBC .4% .3% .5% NS NS 
Const./ 
Unconst. 
1.4% NS/10.9%* 1.6% NS NS 
Treble/ 
No Treble 
NS/1.4%* NS/2.3%* 5.3%* -3%* 4.9%* 
Markup/ 
No Markup 
1.7%* 2.9% 2.1%/.7%* NS NS 












NS- Denotes that the variable is not significant. 
* Denotes a statistically significant distinction between states with a specific provision and            







 Effects of SBC Laws from 1977-1997 
 





SBC Law 1.8% 2.7% NS .9% NS 
YRSSBC .01% -.07% NS .01% .01% 
Const./ 
Unconst. 
1.2%/2.3%* 1.9%/3.6%* -.1.9%* .9%/.9% NS 
Markup/ 
No Markup 
3.5%* 4.3%/1.6%* NS/-1.5% 1.3%/.05%* NS 
Matsushita/ 
Brooke 
.2% NS/-1.5% NS .2%/.2% .2% 
 
NS- Denotes that the variable is not significant. 
* Denotes a statistically significant distinction between states with a specific provision and            


















 Effects of SBC Laws from 1929-1997 
 
 Grocery  Variety Hardware Tire Furniture 
SBC Law -513.23 NS NS 47 -135 
Treble/ 
No Treble 
1984/-752 NS 143 NS NS 
Markup/ 
No Markup 
-517* NS NS NS/117* NS/-380* 
Constitutional/ 
Unconst. 
-644 NS NS/103* 33/115* -124/-189 
Matsushita 338 NS 100 -83 NS 
 
 
NS- Denotes that the variable is not significant. 
* Denotes a statistically significant distinction between states with a specific provision and            



















Figure 4-4 (A) 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.0000117 0.2521 0.0000424 0.0447 0.00000901 0.4478 -0.0000153 0.2053 -0.0000433 0.0000
Urban -0.468567 0.0000 -0.423597 0.0094 0.036509 0.4737 0.239202 0.0000 0.133723 0.3836
PCPI -0.0000111 0.0010 -0.0000141 0.0162 -0.0000132 0.1492 -0.00000617 0.0048 0.0000132 0.1599
SBC 0.011789 0.0013 0.025093 0.0017 0.014877 0.3273 0.016013 0.0044 -0.005164 0.7109
R-Sq 0.824449 0.688475 0.387459 0.568672 0.624859
Adj. R-Sq. 0.79312 0.63288 0.261866 0.480234 0.547941
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Single Establishment Firms as a Percentage of the Total Number of Firms





Figure 4-4 (B) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail -0.00000758 0.0000 -0.0000229 0.0000 -7.85E-06 0.0000 -0.00000912 0.0000 -0.00000266 0.0154
Urban -0.166996 0.0000 -0.14028 0.0041 -0.075977 0.0000 0.001965 0.9242 -0.009356 0.4115
PCPI 0.00000442 0.0000 0.0000152 0.0000 -3.88E-07 0.4143 -0.00000105 0.2955 -6.56E-07 0.1232
SBC 0.017651 0.0000 0.027803 0.0009 0.008913 0.0007 -0.009874 0.1315 0.000363 0.8524
R-Sq 0.86841 0.91036 0.893719 0.866551 0.8179
Adj. R-Sq. 0.858568 0.903655 0.88577 0.856569 0.80428
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Percentage Small Establishments to the Total Number of Establishments                                       
based on Employment Size 



















Figure 4-4 (C) 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.688351 0.0000 0.054581 0.0027 0.160606 0.0002 0.124867 0.0002 0.010983 0.6680
Urban 16689.91 0.0000 186.9436 0.2618 308.851 0.5373 1437.765 0.0000 387.5102 0.1018
Pop -0.00022 0.0003 -0.00000203 0.8786 0.0000818 0.1856 0.0000351 0.0612 0.000188 0.0000
PCPI -0.407824 0.0000 -0.016315 0.0968 -0.068656 0.1856 -0.03741 0.0165 0.0021 0.8790
SBC -513.2305 0.0856 -28.39181 0.2329 -135.4471 0.0602 36.02186 0.3270 47.00309 0.0011
R-Sq 0.864094 0.603516 0.773781 0.879205 0.863777
Adj. R-Sq. 0.849517 0.560989 0.747881 0.865375 0.848181
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Total Establishments







Figure 4-5 (A) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.000013 0.2384 0.000042 0.0582 0.0000103 0.3731 -0.000015 0.2263 -0.000045 0.0000
Urban -0.47227 0.0000 -0.429989 0.0082 0.031904 0.5143 0.234694 0.0000 0.135538 0.3850
PCPI -0.000011 0.0009 -0.0000133 0.0286 -0.0000131 0.1484 -0.0000059 0.0032 0.0000133 0.1515
YRSSBC 0.003556 0.0030 0.002849 0.0238 0.00645 0.1322 0.005076 0.0000 -0.002854 0.2512
R-Sq 0.825921 0.686296 0.392121 0.571674 0.626284
Adj. R-Sq. 0.794855 0.630311 0.267484 0.483852 0.549658
Impact of Time Weighted State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Single Establishment Firms as a Percentage of the Total Number of Firms
















Figure 4-5 (B) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail -0.00000758 0.0000 -0.0000234 0.0000 -0.00000782 0.0000 -0.00000904 0.0000 -0.0000026 0.0207
Urban -0.172749 0.0001 -0.199963 0.0001 -0.074677 0.0000 0.013733 0.5007 -0.002164 0.8481
PCPI 0.00000453 0.0000 0.0000152 0.0000 -0.000000308 0.5241 -0.00000107 0.2903 -0.000000617 0.1506
YRSSBC 0.000146 0.0384 -0.000781 0.0000 0.000157 0.0046 0.0000891 0.3205 0.000149 0.0052
R-Sq 0.865829 0.910314 0.893139 0.866052 0.818617
Adj. R-Sq. 0.855793 0.903606 0.885146 0.856033 0.80505
Impact of Time Weighted State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Percentage Small Establishments to the Total Number of Establishments based on Employment Size 





Figure 4-6 (A) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.0000131 0.1796 0.0000436 0.0424 0.00000754 0.4442 -0.0000139 0.2492 -0.000042 0.0000
Urban -0.466497 0.0000 -0.421927 0.0098 0.032588 0.5021 0.242864 0.0000 0.135098 0.3866
PCPI -0.000011 0.0012 -0.000014 0.0187 -0.0000136 0.1420 -0.00000587 0.0060 0.0000131 0.1707
Markup 0.016743 0.0001 0.02909 0.0074 0.009265 0.4361 0.021255 0.0023 -0.00093 0.9433
No Markup 0.002417 0.6729 0.017553 0.3209 0.024731 0.3048 0.00681 0.0278 -0.014626 0.3660
R-Sq 0.826346 0.688794 0.389134 0.571743 0.625951
Adj. R-Sq. 0.794723 0.632124 0.261227 0.482072 0.54763
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws with Minimum Markup Provisions on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Single Establishment Firms as a Percentage of the Total Number of Firms



















Figure 4-6 (B) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail -0.00000692 0.0000 -0.0000223 0.0000 -0.0000077 0.0000 -0.00000913 0.0000 -0.00000275 0.0127
Urban -0.166464 0.0000 -0.139819 0.0039 -0.075852 0.0000 0.001954 0.9246 -0.009425 0.4102
PCPI 0.0000041 0.0000 0.000015 0.0000 -0.000000463 0.3263 -0.00000104 0.2959 -0.000000615 0.1544
Markup 0.03466 0.0000 0.042524 0.0003 0.012916 0.0001 -0.010219 0.2068 -0.001841 0.4209
No Markup 0.003756 0.2144 0.015778 0.0117 0.005644 0.0178 -0.009593 0.0965 0.002164 0.2451
R-Sq 0.876023 0.911065 0.894265 0.866553 0.818284
Adj. R-Sq. 0.866613 0.904315 0.88624 0.856424 0.804492
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws with Minimum Markup Provisions on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Percentage Small Establishments to the Total Number of Establishments based on Employment Size 









Figure 4-6 (C) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.688237 0.0000 0.054927 0.0031 0.162999 0.0002 0.125286 0.0002 0.010556 0.6792
Urban 16686.55 0.0000 197.1446 0.2638 422.0011 0.3948 1457.619 0.0000 377.9259 0.0934
POP -0.00022 0.0015 -0.0000029 0.8342 0.0000729 0.2421 0.0000335 0.0845 0.00019 0.0000
PCPI -0.408133 0.0000 -0.015377 0.0874 -0.060316 0.0104 -0.035946 0.0145 0.000318 0.9819
Markup -516.994 0.0208 -16.96876 0.1923 -32.10558 0.4163 54.15482 0.2217 24.80731 0.1931
No Markup -504.4633 0.4277 -55.00219 0.3436 -380.1135 0.0360 -6.90883 0.8876 117.2031 0.0054
R-Sq 0.864094 0.603719 0.776376 0.879472 0.864094
Adj. R-Sq. 0.849268 0.560488 0.750326 0.865432 0.848262
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws with Minimum Markup Provisions on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Total Establishments














Figure 4-7 (A) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.0000116 0.2555 0.0000425 0.0447 0.00000775 0.5142 -0.0000167 0.1983 -0.0000447 0.0000
Urban -0.467778 0.0000 -0.424217 0.0090 0.033859 0.5126 0.236327 0.0000 0.136577 0.3698
PCPI -0.0000115 0.0005 -0.0000138 0.0256 -0.0000109 0.1263 -3.68E-06 0.3061 0.0000128 0.1790
Treble 0.003531 0.5253 0.031574 0.2060 0.049547 0.0725 0.053629 0.0000 -0.035369 0.0006
No Treble 0.014403 0.0000 0.023041 0.0001 0.002094 0.8587 0.002144 0.7200 0.000609 0.9656
R-Sq 0.825377 0.688623 0.401302 0.602923 0.630307
Adj. R-Sq. 0.793579 0.631921 0.275943 0.51978 0.552898
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws with Treble Damages on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Single Establishment Firms as a Percentage of the Total Number of Firms





Figure 4-7 (B) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 1.60077 0.0009 0.082913 0.0006 0.249364 0.0002 0.130219 0.0526 -0.024254 0.4774
Urban 17173.86 0.0000 162.4742 0.3062 205.4899 0.6872 1470.429 0.0000 405.8953 0.1031
Pop -0.000297 0.0000 0.000000279 0.9811 0.0000918 0.1207 0.0000308 0.1052 0.000185 0.0000
PCPI -0.378853 0.0045 -0.032492 0.0010 -0.10743 0.0034 -0.043782 0.0157 0.006824 0.5482
Treble 1984.328 0.0000 -79.73504 0.4030 -447.4765 0.1789 143.226 0.0268 82.29214 0.1980
No Treble -751.7503 0.0001 -24.80917 0.2748 85.40161 0.1795 13.82855 0.5968 37.49021 0.1105
R-Sq 0.875203 0.60707 0.781436 0.877882 0.863907
Adj. R-Sq. 0.861589 0.564205 0.755976 0.863657 0.848054
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws with Treble Damages on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Total Establishments














Figure 4-8 (A) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.0000119 0.2435 0.000043 0.0413 0.00000906 0.4467 -0.0000153 0.2069 -0.0000433 0.0000
Urban -0.469332 0.0000 -0.402248 0.0078 0.035451 0.4825 0.238509 0.0000 0.133722 0.3845
PCPI -0.0000118 0.0026 -0.00000876 0.0647 -0.0000138 0.1610 -0.00000651 0.0017 0.0000132 0.1555
Constitutional 0.014368 0.0042 0.020318 0.1214 0.016207 0.3195 0.016885 0.0008 -0.005133 0.7196
Unconstitutional 0.00478 0.4893 0.108668 0.0000 0.003388 0.8291 0.008479 0.5102 0.005417 0.6760
R-Sq 0.825836 0.703164 0.388162 0.569307 0.624859
Adj. R-Sq. 0.794121 0.649111 0.260051 0.479126 0.54631
Impact of Constitutionality of State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Single Establishment Firms as a Percentage of the Total Number of Firms











Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail -0.00000759 0.0000 -0.0000229 0.0000 -0.00000785 0.0000 -0.0000091 0.0000 -0.00000266 0.0156
Urban -0.165806 0.0000 -0.138418 0.0040 -0.075977 0.0000 0.000115 0.9956 -0.009794 0.3928
PCPI 0.00000445 0.0000 0.0000153 0.0000 -0.000000388 0.4143 -0.00000109 0.2803 -0.000000666 0.1178
Constitutional 0.012324 0.0002 0.019467 0.0243 0.008917 0.0006 -0.001589 0.7615 0.002324 0.2319
Unconstitutional 0.023206 0.0000 0.036498 0.0000 0.00891 0.0016 -0.018516 0.0234 -0.001682 0.4704
R-Sq 0.869272 0.910621 0.893719 0.867863 0.818251
Adj. R-Sq. 0.85935 0.903837 0.885653 0.857834 0.804456
Impact of Constitutionality of State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Percentage Small Establishments to the Total Number of Establishments based on Employment Size 




















Figure 4-8 (C) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.707344 0.0062 0.055112 0.0026 0.158895 0.0002 0.126975 0.0001 0.013521 0.5832
Urban 16890.47 0.0000 192.5461 0.2530 291.0703 0.5652 1459.688 0.0000 410.9647 0.0776
POP -0.000214 0.0004 -0.00000185 0.8888 0.0000813 0.1882 0.0000357 0.0585 0.000189 0.0000
PCPI -0.397202 0.0000 -0.016018 0.1095 -0.069231 0.0055 -0.036701 0.0165 0.002908 0.8326
Constitutional -643.7554 0.0191 -32.03791 0.1707 -124.185 0.0857 22.13607 0.5220 33.92206 0.0221
Unconstitutional 167.4773 0.8038 -9.37686 0.7713 -189.6935 0.0219 102.9058 0.0989 115.5183 0.0003
R-Sq 0.86469 0.603593 0.773877 0.879693 0.864079
Adj. R-Sq. 0.849929 0.560349 0.747537 0.865679 0.848246
Impact of Constitutionality of State Sales Below Cost Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Total Establishments





Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.0000118 0.2654 0.0000427 0.0592 0.00000839 0.4958 -0.0000155 0.2090 -0.000043 0.0000
Urban -0.470325 0.0000 -0.409532 0.0122 0.022897 0.6105 0.228228 0.0000 0.133609 0.3299
PCPI -0.0000107 0.0024 -0.0000151 0.0108 -0.0000119 0.2075 -0.00000498 0.0333 0.0000141 0.1383
ALL 0.016535 0.0009 0.024659 0.2300 0.020337 0.2879 0.011655 0.2745 0.017107 0.1858
SBCFT 0.021022 0.0041 -0.009547 0.6169 0.030919 0.0550 0.023851 0.1108 0.002778 0.8155
FTNS 0.00663 0.0225 -0.003079 0.8664 0.009174 0.4011 -0.001516 0.8556 0.026277 0.0001
FT 0.001023 0.9227 -0.008101 0.6446 0.029238 0.0280 0.009816 0.4612 0.020925 0.0000
SBCO 0.010887 0.2293 0.022724 0.3203 0.047527 0.0876 0.043199 0.0000 0.0044985 0.8350
R-Sq 0.825765 0.691396 0.395395 0.580249 0.631804
Adj. R-Sq. 0.792112 0.63179 0.260793 0.4868 0.549834
Impact of State Sales Below Cost and Fair Trade Laws on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Single Establishment Firms as a Percentage of the Total Number of Firms

















Figure 4-10 (A) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail -0.00000761 0.0000 -0.0000235 0.0000 -0.00000783 0.0000 -0.00000904 0.0000 -0.00000264 0.0180
Urban -0.176076 0.0001 -0.212011 0.0000 -0.076774 0.0000 0.013834 0.5134 -0.006627 0.5688
PCPI 0.00000454 0.0000 0.0000153 0.0000 -0.000000298 0.5377 -0.00000106 0.2924 -0.000000615 0.1479
SBCM 0.001639 0.0248 0.00084 0.6150 0.00196 0.0005 0.000996 0.4008 0.001744 0.0398
SBCB 0.001417 0.1881 -0.014946 0.0000 0.002002 0.0145 0.001496 0.2219 0.001146 0.2389
R-Sq 0.865773 0.911023 0.893153 0.866068 0.818427
Adj. R-Sq. 0.855585 0.90427 0.885043 0.855903 0.804646
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws after Brooke and Matsushita on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Percentage Small Establishments to the Total Number of Establishments based on Employment Size 







Figure 4-10 (B) 
 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
Retail 0.696833 67.0000 0.054047 0.0046 0.0311 0.5587 0.126414 0.0001 0.008612 0.7481
Urban 16933.87 0.0000 190.528 0.2795 -462.3817 0.0010 1448.191 0.0000 345.0896 0.1736
Pop -0.000217 0.0003 -0.00000196 0.8834 0.000149 0.0000 0.0000352 0.0611 0.000188 0.0000
PCPI -0.375912 0.0001 -0.016154 0.0502 -0.029304 0.1185 -0.035278 0.0273 -0.00177 0.8930
SBCM 338.2294 0.0123 -27.43595 0.3310 25.26562 0.3134 99.67316 0.0004 83.07748 0.0315
R-Sq 0.86367 0.603395 0.769396 0.880238 0.864075
Adj. R-Sq. 0.849047 0.560855 0.762927 0.866526 0.848513
Impact of State Sales Below Cost Laws after Matsushita on Small Firms 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Establishments 
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